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The	  Real	  Combination	  Problem:	  Panpsychism,	  Micro-­‐Subjects,	  
and	  Emergence1	  	  
0.	  Introduction	  Panpsychists	  hold	  that	  all	  matter	  possesses	  mental	  properties	  of	  some	  form.	  The	  main	   motivation	   for	   panpsychism	   is	   the	   perceived	   failure	   of	   reductive	  physicalism—the	  project	  of	  explaining,	   inter	  alia,	   the	   instantiation	  of	   conscious	  experience	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   conventionally	   understood	   physical	   matter	   and	  properties.	   Such	   physical	   matter	   and	   properties	   are	   presumed	   not	   to	   include	  mental	   properties	   at	   the	   basic	   level.2	  According	   to	   panpsychists,	   the	   moral	   of	  anti-­‐physicalist	   arguments	   like	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   and	   the	   zombie	  argument	   is	   that	   from	   ingredients	   entirely	   lacking	   in	   consciousness,	  consciousness	   cannot	   derive.3	  To	   adequately	   account	   for	   the	   instantiation	   of	  consciousness	   in	   beings	   like	   us,	   panpsychists	   aver,	   we	   must	   take	   mental	  properties	  as	  part	  of	  the	  fundamental	  furniture	  of	  the	  material	  world.4	  	  	  I	  consider	  overall	  that	  the	  panpsychist	  explanatory	  project	  is	  well-­‐motivated,	  and	  that	   panpsychists	   are	   in	   the	   right	   ballpark	   for	   a	   here-­‐and-­‐now	   solution	   to	   the	  mind/body	  problem.5	  I	  won’t	  attempt	   to	  motivate	  panpsychism	  with	  respect	   to	  physicalism,	  but	  take	  it	  that	  if	  a	  viable	  panpsychist	  theory	  could	  be	  described,	  it	  would	  represent	  at	  least	  an	  attractive	  option	  on	  the	  field	  of	  metaphysics	  of	  mind.	  My	   concern	   is	   with	   difficulties	   internal	   to	   panpsychism,	   and	   with	   where	   the	  intuitions	  driving	  panpsychism	  should	  propel	  one	  if	  those	  difficulties	  turn	  out	  to	  be	   insuperable.	   The	   discussion	   should	   be	   of	   interest	   to	   any	   theorists	  who	   still	  hope	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  consciousness	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  material	  underpinnings:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thanks	   to	   Gregg	   Rosenberg	   in	   particular	   for	   helpful	   comments	   on	   this	   paper,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  attendees	  of	  the	  ‘Panpsychism	  on	  the	  Reef’	  conference	  of	  July	  2012	  organised	  by	  David	  Chalmers,	  and	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  this	  journal.	  2	  Cf.	  Stoljar	  2006.	  3	  For	  a	  recent	  example	  of	   this	  sort	  of	  argument	  see	  Strawson	  2006.	  See	  also	  Nagel	  1979,	   James	  1890.	  	  4	  As	  Nagel	   and	  Strawson	   in	  particular	  make	   clear,	   if	   the	  phenomenal	   can	  only	  derive	   from	   the	  phenomenal,	   then	   ultimate	   entities	   (e.g.	   basic	   particles)	   must	   be	   phenomenal:	   since	   were	  phenomenality	  to	  first	  arise	  at	  any	  non-­‐basic	  level,	  it	  would	  derive	  from	  the	  non-­‐phenomenal.	  5	  As	  compared	  with	  a	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	  solution	  like	  Stoljar’s	  (2006).	  Stoljar	  believes	  we	  should	  await	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  non-­‐mental	   intrinsic	  nature	  to	  matter	  which	  would	  make	  the	  instantiation	  of	  macro-­‐consciousness	  intelligible.	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the	  question	  at	  the	  center	  of	  that	  enterprise,	  and	  of	  this	  paper,	  is	  quite	  how	  rich	  the	   properties	   of	   micro-­‐matter	   must	   be	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   macro-­‐consciousness.	  	  	  Panpsychism	  harbors	  an	  unresolved	  tension,	  the	  seriousness	  of	  which	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  appreciated.	  I	  capture	  this	  tension	  as	  a	  dilemma,	  and	  offer	  panpsychists	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  resolve	  it.	  The	  dilemma,	  briefly,	  is	  as	  follows.	  Panpsychists	  are	  committed	  to	  the	  perspicuous	  explanation	  of	  macro-­‐mentality	  in	  terms	  of	  micro-­‐mentality	   (in	   a	   sense	   of	   ‘perspicuous	   explanation’	   to	   be	   elucidated).	   But	  panpsychists	  take	  the	  micro-­‐material	  realm	  to	  feature	  not	  just	  mental	  properties,	  but	  also	  micro-­‐subjects	  to	  whom	  these	  properties	  belong.	  Yet	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  explain	   the	   constitution	   of	   a	   macro-­‐subject	   (like	   one	   of	   us)	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  assembly	  of	  micro-­‐subjects,	  for,	  I	  will	  argue,	  subjects	  cannot	  combine.	  Therefore	  the	  panpsychist	  explanatory	  project	  is	  derailed	  by	  the	  insistence	  that	  the	  world’s	  ultimate	   material	   constituents	   (ultimates)	   are	   subjects	   of	   experience.	   The	  panpsychist	   faces	  a	   choice	  of	  abandoning	  her	  explanatory	  project,	  or	   recanting	  the	   claim	   that	   the	  ultimates	   are	   subjects.	   This	   is	   the	  dilemma.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  latter	  option	  is	  to	  be	  preferred.	  This	  needn’t	  constitute	  a	  wholesale	  abandonment	  of	   panpsychism,	   however,	   since	   panpsychists	   can	   maintain	   that	   the	   ultimates	  possess	  phenomenal	  qualities,	  despite	  not	  being	  subjects	  of	  those	  qualities.	  This	  proposal	   requires	   us	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   phenomenal	   qualities	   existing	  independently	   of	   experiencing	   subjects,	   a	   challenge	   I	   tackle	   in	   the	  penultimate	  section.	  The	  position	  eventually	  reached	  is	  a	  form	  of	  neutral	  monism,	  so	  another	  way	   to	   express	   the	   overall	   argument	   is	   to	   say	   that,	   keeping	   true	   to	   their	  philosophical	  motivations,	   panpsychists	   should	   really	   be	   neutral	  monists.	   This	  shift	   carries	   a	   further	  boon:	   as	  well	   as	  being	  a	   coherent	  position—something	   I	  argue	   undiluted	   panpsychism	   is	   not—neutral	   monism	   is	   somewhat	   closer	   to	  physicalistic	  respectability,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  assert	  that	  basic	  material	  ontology	  is	  rife	  with	  subjects	  of	  experience.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	   argument	   assumes	   a	   robust	   realism	   about	   human	   subjects—that	   there	   really	   are	   such	  subjects,	   and	   that	   they	   are	   not	   merely	   (in	   some	   sense)	   splinters	   of	   a	   greater,	   universe-­‐sized	  subject.	  I	  take	  this	  premise	  to	  have	  empirical	  support—we	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  such	  subjects	  (cf.	  James	  1912/2005:13-­‐14).	  But	  I	  don’t	  expect	  others	  to	  find	  this	  evidence	  uncontroversial,	  and	  am	   therefore	   prepared	   to	   accord	   this	   realism	   the	   status	   of	  mere	   assumption.	   The	   assumption	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The	   dialectic	   revolves	   around	   a	   comparison	   between	   panpsychism	   and	  emergentism,	   so	   I	   begin	   by	   outlining	   this	   comparison,	   before	   moving	   to	   a	  discussion	   of	   the	   combination	   problem,	   and	   then	   to	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  difficulty	  positing	  micro-­‐subjects	  causes	  for	  panpsychism—a	  difficulty	  it	  cannot	  overcome,	  and	  which	  ultimately	  motivates	  theory-­‐change.	  	  
1.	  Panpsychism	  and	  Emergentism	  	  Panpsychism’s	   metaphysical	   and	   explanatory	   aspirations	   can	   be	   clarified	  through	   comparison	   with	   emergentism.	   The	   general	   idea	   of	   ‘emergence’	  concerns	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  property	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  being	  or	  organisation	  which	  is	  absent	  at	  lower	  levels.	  Emergentism	  takes	  two	  forms,	  strong	  and	  weak.	  Weak	  emergentism	  amounts	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  novel	  property	  is	  unpredictable	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  lower-­‐level	  base	  from	  which	  it	  arises.	  But	  this	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  strictly	   an	   epistemological	   limitation	   for	   those	   studying	   the	   properties	   of	   the	  lower-­‐level	   base.	   Perhaps	   they	   don’t	   possess	   every	   scrap	   of	   lower-­‐level	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  novel	  property.	  Or	  perhaps	  there	  is	  some	   deeper	   reason	   why	   occurrences	   of	   the	   property	   remain	   unpredictable.7	  Weak	   emergentism	   stops	   short	   of	   claiming	   that	   emergents	   are	   ontological	  novelties:	  in	  fact	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  of	  a	  piece	  with	  their	  bases,	  and	  in	  principle	  their	   instantiations	   are	   wholly	   deducible	   (i.e.	   for	   an	   ideal	   reasoner).	   Strong	  emergentism,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   some	   properties	   are	   genuinely	  ontologically	  novel	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  lower-­‐level	  bases.	  Strong	  emergents	  are	  unpredictable	   in	   principle.	   Such	   properties	   also	   possess	   autonomous	   causal	  powers.8	  For	   these	   reasons	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   strong	   emergentism	   concerning	  mental	  properties	  implies	  property	  dualism.9	  	  Panpsychists	   shun	   emergentism,	   especially	   of	   the	   strong	   variety.	   They	   might	  allow	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  contingent	  gap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  generation	  of	  macro-­‐mentality	  from	  its	  material	  underpinnings,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  panpsychism’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  prevents	   the	   panpsychist’s	   dilemma	   branching	   into	   a	   tetralemma:	   we	   can	   rule	   out	   subject	  monism	  or	  nihilism	  as	  options.	  Thanks	  to	  Luke	  Roelofs	  for	  discussion	  of	  this	  point.	  7	  Humans	  might	  not	  be	  intelligent	  enough	  to	  carry	  through	  the	  derivation,	  for	  example.	  	  8	  See	  e.g.	  Humphreys	  1997.	  9	  See	  e.g.	  Brüntrup	  1998.	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raison	   d’etre	   to	   preserve	   ontological	   continuity	   between	   the	   world’s	   lower	  ontological	   levels	   and	   the	   conscious	  macro-­‐mentality	   arising	   from	   these	   levels.	  With	   this	   commitment	   comes	   the	   doctrine	   that	   the	   generation	   of	   conscious	  mentality	   from	  material	   underpinnings	   is	   in	   principle	   perspicuously	   explicable.	  This	  idea	  can	  be	  captured	  by	  saying	  that	  given	  a	  suitably	  complete	  catalogue	  of	  the	  world’s	  micro-­‐material	   contents,	   it	   should	  be	   inconceivable10	  that	   ours	   is	   a	  zombie	  world—one	   lacking	  higher-­‐level	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   of	   the	   sort	  we	   actually	   enjoy.	   Given	   the	   conceivability	   of	   physical	   zombies,	   panpsychists	  deem	  physicalist	  ontology	   short	  on	   resources	   for	   capturing	   consciousness.	  The	  required	   ‘extra’	   is	   to	   be	   supplied	   by	   a	   distribution	   of	   micro-­‐phenomenal	  properties	   across	   the	   ultimates.	   The	   panpsychist	   seeks	   thereby	   to	   add	   just	  enough	   to	   the	   world’s	   micro-­‐ingredients,	   as	   conceived	   by	   physicalism,	   to	  logically	   guarantee	   the	   instantiation	   of	   macro-­‐consciousness.	   The	   presence	   of	  macro-­‐consciousness	   should	   flow	   from	   the	   properties	   of	   the	   ultimates	   plus	  details	  of	  their	  arrangement.	  	  	  	  This	   commitment	   to	   ‘smooth	   transition’—i.e.	   non-­‐emergence—is	   on	   display	   in	  the	   main	   philosophical	   vertebrae	   comprising	   modern-­‐day	   panpsychism:	   the	  writings	   of	   James,	   Nagel	   and	   Strawson.	   	   James,	   the	   father	   of	   modern	  panpsychism,	  found	  that:	  	   The	  demand	  for	  continuity	  has,	  over	  large	  tracts	  of	  science,	  proved	  itself	   to	   possess	   true	   prophetic	   power.	   We	   ought	   therefore	  ourselves	   sincerely	   to	   try	   every	   possible	   mode	   of	   conceiving	   the	  dawn	  of	  consciousness	  so	  that	  it	  may	  not	  appear	  equivalent	  to	  the	  irruption	  into	  the	  universe	  of	  a	  new	  nature,	  non-­‐existent	  until	  then.	  	  	  And	  the	  explicit	  reasoning	  leading	  James	  to	  panpsychism	  went:	  ‘If	  evolution	  is	  to	  
work	   smoothly,	   consciousness	   in	   some	   shape	  must	   have	   been	   present	   at	   the	   very	  
origin	  of	  things.’11	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  usual	  restrictions	  apply:	  ideally	  conceivable	  for	  an	  idealised	  reasoner.	  See	  Chalmers	  2002	  for	  explanation	  of	  these	  ideas.	  	  11	  	  1890:148-­‐149.	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Nagel	   is	   largely	   responsible	   for	   re-­‐igniting	   interest	   in	   panpsychism	   in	   recent	  decades,	   having	   been	   brave	   enough	   to	   examine	   a	   theory	   of	   mind	   that,	   as	   the	  twentieth	   century	   closed,	   was	   largely	   ignored—or	   else	   considered	   laughable.	  The	   key	   premise	   of	   Nagel’s	   argument	   for	   pansychism	   is	   his	   rejection	   of	  emergence:	  	   there	   are	   no	   truly	   emergent	   properties	   of	   complex	   systems.	   All	  properties	  of	  complex	  systems	  that	  are	  not	  relations	  between	  it	  and	  something	   else	   derive	   from	   the	   properties	   of	   its	   constituents	   and	  their	  effects	  on	  each	  other	  when	  so	  combined.12	  	  	  From	  this	  principle,	  plus	  the	  claims	  that	  a	  conscious	  being	  is	  constructible	  from	  mere	  matter,	  and	   that	  a	  physicalist	   construal	  of	   such	  matter	   (as	   fundamentally	  lacking	   mentality)	   cannot	   account	   for	   consciousness,	   Nagel	   infers	   that	  consciousness	  must	  be	  present	  in	  basic	  matter.	  	  	  Strawson’s	  work	  brought	  panpsychism	  to	  the	  attention,	  and	  critical	  scrutiny,	  of	  mainstream	   philosophers	   of	  mind,	   also	  making	   a	   new	   generation	   aware	   of	   its	  appeal.	  His	  argument	  for	  panpsychism	  departs	  not	  far	  from	  Nagel’s	  formulation,	  but	  Strawson	  contributes	  a	  clear	  and	  forceful	  presentation,	  allied	  to	  a	  sustained	  defence	   of	   the	   non-­‐emergence	   principle.	   This	   he	   expresses	  with	   characteristic	  pithiness:	  	   You	  can	  get	  liquidity	  from	  non-­‐liquid	  molecules	  as	  easily	  as	  you	  can	  get	  a	  cricket	  team	  from	  eleven	  things	  that	  are	  not	  cricket	  teams.	  In	  God’s	   physics,	   it	   would	   have	   to	   be	   just	   as	   plain	   how	   you	   get	  experiential	  phenomena	   from	  wholly	  non-­‐experiential	  phenomena	  [i.e.	  matter	  as	  construed	  by	  physicalism]13	  	  In	   understanding	   the	   production	   of	   liquidity	   from	   non-­‐liquid	   components	   we	  move,	   says	   Strawson,	   ‘in	   a	   small	   set	   of	   conceptually	   homogenous	   shape-­‐size-­‐mass-­‐charge-­‐number-­‐position-­‐motion-­‐involving	   physics	   notions’ 14 	  These	  notions	   provide	   no	   conceptual	   bridge	   to	   consciousness—hence	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  	  1979:182.	  13	  2006:15.	  14	  2006:13.	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conceivability	   of	   physical	   zombies—so,	   for	   Strawson,	   nothing	   short	   of	   positing	  phenomenality	  as	  a	  property	  of	  the	  ultimates	  will	  suffice	  as	  an	  explanatory	  basis	  for	  macro-­‐consciousness.	  	  	  Panpsychism	   thus	   stands	   opposed	   to	   emergentism.15 	  It	   has	   been	   said	   that	  austere	   reductive	   physicalism	   is	   suited	   to	   those	   with	   a	   taste	   for	   desert	  landscapes.	  Still,	   from	  the	  panpsychist	  perspective	  such	  physicalism,	  along	  with	  dualism	   and	   emergentism,	   all	   seem	   committed	   to	   discomfitingly	   abrupt	  ontological	  inclines—spots	  where	  the	  material	  landscape	  of	  a	  sudden	  manifests	  mentality,	  having	  just	  previously	  shown	  not	  the	  least	  sign	  of	  doing	  so.	  On	  these	  views	   consciousness	   irrupts	   onto	   the	   scenery	   unexpectedly,	   in	   sharply	   jutting	  outcrops.	  Panpsychists	  might	   then	  be	  described	  as	   those	   theorists	  with	  a	   taste	  for	   only	   gently	   graded	   landscapes.	   They	   decline	   to	   scale	   the	   sheer	   slopes	   of	  sudden	  mentality.	  	  
2.	  Constitutive	  Panpsychism	  The	  panpsychist	  posits	  mentality	  as	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  matter	  from	  a	  deep	  commitment	   to	   the	   non-­‐emergence	   principle.	   But	   how	   should	   one	   understand	  the	   relationship	   between	   this	   basic	   mentality	   and	   high-­‐level	   consciousness?	  Given	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  smooth	  and	  intelligible	  transition	  from	  the	  micro-­‐material	  to	   the	   macro-­‐conscious—what	   Van	   Cleve	   dubs	   panpsychism’s	   ‘mereological	  rationalism’ 16—the	   natural	   way	   to	   construe	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  mentality	  of	  the	  ultimates	  and	  the	  conscious	  mentality	  of	  high-­‐level	  individuals	  is	  to	  say	  the	  former	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  	  The	   broad	   idea	   behind	   this	   constitutive	  panpsychism17	  is	   as	   follows.	   Consider	   a	  macro-­‐subject,	  one	  of	  us,	  having	  an	  experience	  of	  being	  cold,	  tired	  and	  smelling	  roast	  beef.18	  This	  experience	  is	  unified	  in	  the	  following	  sense:	  though	  the	  subject	  can	   attend	  now	   to	   the	   sensation	  of	   cold,	   now	   to	  her	   tiredness,	   and	  now	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Cf.	   Van	   Cleve	   (1990),	   who	   responds	   to	   Nagel	   by	   arguing	   that	   emergentism	   is	   preferable	   to	  panpsychism	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  his	  argument.	  	  16	  1990:	  218.	  17	  The	  name	  is	  due	  to	  Chalmers	  (talk	  at	  Hochschule	  of	  Philosophy,	  Munich,	  June	  2011).	  	  18	  The	  example	  is	  Goff’s	  (2009).	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smell	   of	   roast	   beef,	   still,	   phenomenologically-­‐speaking,	   these	   three	   sensations	  are	   given	   to	   her	   all	   in	   one	   go.	   Her	   phenomenological	   point	   of	   view	   appears	  suffused	  by	  all	  three	  together,	  as	  opposed	  to	  experiencing	  them	  only	  discretely,	  in	  series.	  It	   is	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  unified	  phenomenal	  fields	  as	  we	  each	  enjoy,	  featuring	  at	  a	  time	  many	  different	  sorts	  of	  phenomenal	  element,	  that	  any	  theory	  of	   consciousness	   must	   adequately	   explain.	   On	   constitutive	   panpsychism	   this	  unified	   experiential	   field	   is	   literally	   constituted	   by	   parts,	   ultimates	   in	   the	  subject’s	  brain,	  instantiating	  just	  those	  qualities	  that	  feature	  in	  consciousness.	  So	  the	  macro-­‐experience	  of	  feeling	  cold,	  tired	  and	  smelling	  roast	  beef	  is	  constituted	  by	   one	   set	   of	   ultimates	   instantiating	   phenomenal	   coldness,	   another	   set	  instantiating	   phenomenal	   tiredness,	   and	   a	   further	   set	   instantiating	   roast	   beef	  smell.	  These	  groups	  of	  ultimates	   together	   compose	   the	   consciousness-­‐realising	  portion	  of	  the	  subject’s	  brain.	  	  This	  is	  an	  over-­‐simplified	  model	  of	  what	  the	  constitutive	  panpsychist	  intends,19	  but	   the	   guiding	   idea	   is	   clear	   enough.	   Any	   phenomenal	   qualities	   figuring	   in	   the	  macro-­‐experience	   are	   put	   there	   through	   being	   carried	   by	   the	   phenomenally-­‐qualitied	   ultimates	   jointly	   composing	   the	   relevant	   part	   of	   the	   subject’s	   brain.	  Thus	  we	   can	   trace	   the	  macro-­‐phenomenology	   to	   the	   phenomenal	   states	   of	   the	  ultimates	   in	   a	   smooth	   way,	   and	   panpsychists	   can	   account	   for	   the	   macro-­‐experiential	   state	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   matter	   composing	   it.	   This	   explanatory	  operation	   is	   essentially	   no	   more	   difficult	   than	   accounting	   for	   the	   overall	  composition	   of	   a	   painted	   canvas	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   various	   patches	   of	   paint	  filling	   it,	   along	   with	   their	   qualities.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   phenomenal	   paint,	   this	   is	  achieved	  by	  taking	  phenomenal	  qualities	  to	  belong	  to	  basic	  matter,	  and	  by	  taking	  this	   matter	   not	   only	   to	   materially	   constitute	   the	   subject,	   but	   to	   phenomenally	  
compose	  her	  experiential	   field	  as	  well;	   that	   is	  to	  say,	   the	  phenomenal	  quality	  of	  each	  experiential	  field-­‐composing	  ultimate	  finds	  its	  way	  into	  the	  conscious	  state	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For	   one	   thing,	   there	  will	   have	   to	   be	   some	   sort	   of	  qualitative	  blending	   or	  pooling	   among	   the	  qualities	   carried	   by	   each	   ultimate:	   if	   each	   ultimate’s	   quality	   showed	   up	   as	   such	   in	   the	  macro-­‐experience,	  it	  would	  lack	  the	  notable	  homogeneity	  of	  (e.g.)	  color	  experience,	  and	  plausibly	  some	  mixing	  of	  basic	  qualities	   is	   required	   to	  obtain	   the	  qualities	  of	  macro-­‐experience.	   I	   revisit	   these	  issues	   from	   section	   4	   onwards,	   arguing	   that	   they	   are	   not	   terribly	   problematic	   for	   panpsychist	  models	  of	  combination.	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The	  experiential	  field,	  composed	  in	  this	  way	  by	  the	  relevant	  micro-­‐phenomenal	  items,	  counts	  as	  what	  O’Connor	  and	  Wong	  term	  a	  ‘structural	  property’,	  where:	  	   there	  is	  nothing	  more	  to	  having	  the	  structural	  property	  than	  being	  composed	   by	   parts	   having	   certain	   other	   properties	   and	   bearing	  certain	  relations	  to	  one	  another—it	  is	  ontologically	  reducible.20	  	  In	  our	  case,	   instantiating	  the	  macro-­‐experience	  of	  coldness,	  tiredness	  and	  roast	  beef	   smell	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   having	   a	   certain	   brain-­‐state	   composed	   of	  ultimates	   some	   of	   which	   instantiate	   phenomenal	   coldness,	   some	   phenomenal	  tiredness,	   and	   some	   phenomenal	   roast	   beef	   smell.21	  Constitutive	   panpsychism	  thus	  successfully	  evades	  emergentism,	  providing	  a	  satisfactory	  realisation	  story	  for	   macro-­‐experientiality	   by	   its	   material	   underpinnings.	   Put	   in	   the	   terms	  employed	  earlier	  to	  capture	  the	  panpsychist’s	  explanatory	  ambitions:	  it	  ought	  to	  be	   that	   given	   full	   specification	   of	   the	   ultimates	   composing	   the	   subject’s	  experience,	   including	   details	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   quality	   each	   carries,	   it	   is	  inconceivable	   both	   that	   this	  micro-­‐material	   setup	   obtains	   and	   that	   the	   subject	  does	  not	  instantiate	  an	  experiential	  state	  featuring	  coldness,	  tiredness	  and	  roast	  beef	   smell.	   Since	   the	   phenomenally-­‐qualitied	   ultimates	   in	   question	   (jointly)	  instantiate	  these	  very	  qualities,	  and	  constitute	  the	  subject’s	  experience,	  this	  test	  appears	   to	   be	   passed.	   The	   absence	   of	   the	   subject’s	   experience	   seems	   no	  more	  conceivable	  than	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  certain	  painting	  once	  we	  have	  stipulated	  that	  a	  set	  of	  paint	  patches	  is	  arranged	  thus-­‐and-­‐so,	  in	  these-­‐and-­‐those	  colors.	  	  Constitutive	   panpsychism	   is	   thus	   faithful	   to	   the	   panpsychist’s	   core	   concern:	   to	  posit	   enough	   in	   the	   material	   fundamentals	   for	   a	   smooth	   realisation	   story	   for	  macro-­‐consciousness.	   Indeed,	   it	   seems	   the	   most	   natural	   way	   of	   meeting	   the	  panpsychist’s	   explanatory	   requirements.	   So	   I	   will	   henceforth	   equate	   (anti-­‐emergentist)	  panpsychism	  with	  constitutive	  panpsychism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  2005:10.	  See	  also	  Armstrong	  1978.	  Note	  that	  the	  anti-­‐emergence	  premise	  in	  Nagel’s	  argument	  for	   panpsychism	   expresses	   the	   same	   idea.	   The	   panpsychist	   anti-­‐emergence	   principle	   is	  effectively	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  non-­‐basic	  properties	  are	  structural.	  	  21	  Wong	  and	  O’Connor’s	  characterisation	  requires	  that	  the	  components	  not	  possess	  the	  higher-­‐level	   property.	   This	   requirement	   is	   met	   in	   the	   present	   case:	   the	   higher-­‐level	   property	   is	   of	  experiencing	   coldness	   and	   tiredness	   and	   roast	   beef	   smell,	   and	   no	   ultimate	   possesses	   this	  conjunctive	  property.	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3.	  Panpsychism	  and	  Micro-­‐Subjects	  The	   panpsychist’s	   ultimates	   possess	   phenomenal	   qualities.	   For	   example,	   the	  ultimates	   constituting	   the	   experience	   just	   considered	   possessed	   phenomenal	  qualities	   like	   phenomenal	   coldness,	   tiredness	   and	   roast	   beef	   smell.	   But	  phenomenal	   qualities	   are	   properties	   that	   characterise	   conscious	   experience	   of	  the	   sort	  we	   (macro-­‐subjects)	   enjoy;	   they	   are	   those	   qualities	   such	   that	   there	   is	  
something	   it	   is	   like22	  to	   have	   them,	   something	   it	   is	   like,	   crucially,	   for	   the	   haver.	  But	  if	  they	  are	  like	  something	  for	  the	  haver,	  that	  haver	  would	  seem	  a	  fortiori	  to	  be	  a	   subject	  of	   experience—since	  a	   subject	   is	   just	   that	   sort	  of	   entity	   for	  whom	  anything	   can	   be	   like	   anything	   at	   all.	   This	   ‘for’,	   in	   other	   words,	   seems	   to	   drag	  ineluctably	  in	  its	  wake	  the	  notion	  of	  subjectivity,	  and	  its	  corollary,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  phenomenological	  point	  of	  view.	  Something	  can	  be	  like	  something	  for	  you	  but	  not	  like	  anything	  for	  me	  precisely	  because	  we	  are	  distinct	  subjects	  occupying	  distinct	  points	   of	   view	   in	   (and	   upon)	   the	   world.	   So	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   phenomenal	  qualities	  necessarily	  exist	  as	  belonging	  to	  subjects.	  This,	   in	  turn,	  would	  convert	  the	   ultimates	   into	   subjects,	   since	   the	   panpsychist’s	   ultimates	   possess	  phenomenal	  qualities.	   It’s	   unsurprising,	   then,	   that	  most	  historical	  panpsychists	  agree	  that	  the	  ultimates	  are	  subjects	  of	  experience.	  	  As	  Goff	  says:	  ‘If	  panpsychism	  is	   true	   then	   physical	   ultimates	   are	   subjects	   of	   experience…there	   is	   something	  that	  it’s	  like	  to	  be	  a	  physical	  ultimate.’23	  Strawson	  is	  equally	  clear	  on	  this	  point.24	  	  For	   constitutive	   panpsychists,	   then,	   human	   experiencers	   are	   at	   bottom	  constituted	  by	  materially	  fundamental	   ‘micro-­‐subjects’—corresponding	  to	  basic	  physical	   particles—who	   are	   the	   first	   holders	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   qualities	   we	  enjoy	  atop	  our	  macroscopic	  perches.	  	  	  We	   must	   now	   ask:	   What	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   these	  fundamental	   subjects	   and	   the	   unified,	   single-­‐perspective	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  human	   subjects	   they	   compose?	   For	   simplicity	   we’ll	   consider	   only	   the	  relationship	   between	   ultimate-­‐subjects	   and	   human	   subjects,	   without	   worrying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  This,	   and	   related	   phrases	   (e.g.	   ‘what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐likeness’)	   commonly	   used	   to	   evoke	   phenomenal	  consciousness	  derive	  from	  Nagel	  1974.	  23	  Goff	  2009:301.	  24	  See	  his	  2006.	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whether	  the	  ultimate-­‐subjects	  also	  compose	  subjects	  composing	  us,	  e.g.	  subjects	  corresponding	  to	  brain-­‐hemispheres.	  	  We	  grasped	  well	  enough,	  in	  outline,	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  macro-­‐qualitative	  state	  of	   coldness,	   tiredness	  and	   roast	  beef	   smell	   by	   adverting	   to	   composing	   ultimates	  which	  jointly	  instantiated	  just	  those	  qualities.	  It	  was	  something	  like	  the	  way	  we	  understand	  the	  composition	  of	  a	  painting	  by	  thinking	  about	  the	  various	  painted	  patches	  filling	  the	  canvas:	  we	  consider	  their	  qualities	   in	   isolation,	  and	  see	  how,	  by	   assembling	   the	   qualitative	   patches,	   we	   obtain	   the	   complete	   image.	   But,	   we	  will	   see,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   to	   understand,	   in	   parallel	   fashion,	   the	   assembly	   of	  subjects	   into	  a	   larger	  subject.	  Subjects	  do	  not	  combine.	  This	   leaves	  constitutive	  panpsychism	   in	   a	   pickle.	   To	   lay	   the	   ground	   for	   this	   difficulty,	   it’s	   time	   we	  introduced	  the	  notorious	  combination	  problem	  for	  panpsychism.	  	  
4.	  The	  Combination	  Problem	  Seager	  coined	  the	  name,25	  describing	   the	  combination	  problem	  as	   ‘the	  problem	  of	   explaining	  how	   complex	   conscious	   states	   emerge	   from	   the	  primitive	  mental	  states	  ascribed	   [by	  panpsychists]	   to…fundamental	  entities’.26	  This	   specification,	  however,	  is	  ambiguous	  between	  two	  distinct	  difficulties	  in	  particular.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	   only	   the	   second,	   the	   subject	   combination	   problem,	   need	   seriously	   worry	  panpsychists.	  Unfortunately,	   this	   difficulty	   is	   also	   insuperable,	   and	   it	   is	   on	   this	  rock	  that	  traditional	  panpsychism	  runs	  aground.	  	  The	  combination	  problem	  is	  originally	  due	  to	  James,	  who	  famously	  formulates	  it	  thus:	  	   Take	   a	   hundred	   [feelings],	   shuffle	   them	   and	   pack	   them	   as	   close	  together	  as	  you	  can	  (whatever	  that	  might	  mean);	  still	  each	  remains	  the	   same	   feeling	   it	   always	   was,	   shut	   in	   its	   own	   skin,	   windowless,	  ignorant	  of	  what	  the	  other	  feelings	  are	  and	  mean.	  There	  would	  be	  a	  hundred-­‐and-­‐first	   feeling	   there,	   if,	   when	   a	   group	   or	   series	   of	   such	  feelings	  were	  set	  up,	  a	  consciousness	  belonging	  to	  the	  group	  as	  such	  should	   emerge.	   And	   this	   101st	   feeling	  would	   be	   a	   totally	   new	   fact;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Seager	  1995.	  26	  MS:6.	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the	  100	  original	  feelings	  might,	  by	  a	  curious	  physical	  law,	  be	  a	  signal	  for	   its	   creation,	  when	   they	   came	   together;	   but	   they	  would	   have	   no	  substantial	   identity	   with	   it,	   nor	   it	   with	   them,	   and	   one	   could	   never	  deduce	  the	  one	  from	  the	  others,	  or	  (in	  any	  intelligible	  sense)	  say	  that	  they	  evolved	  it.27	  	  To	   isolate	   the	   two	   versions	   of	   the	   combination	   problem,	   we	   should	   examine	  what	  James	  means	  by	  ‘feeling’.	  	  There	  are	  two	  possibilities,	  which	  are	  not	  usually	  distinguished.	   First,	   James	   may	   simply	   mean	   by	   ‘feeling’	   something	   like	  ‘qualitative	  element’,	  a	  notion	  explained	  as	  follows.	  Consider	  your	  current	  overall	  phenomenal	   field—your	   complete	   experience,	   such	   that	   this	   comprises	   other	  things	  which	  could	  be	  called	  experiences	  (like	  the	  feeling	  of	  your	  bottom	  on	  your	  chair,	  or	  your	  visual	  experience	  of	  this	  page)	  and	  such	  that	  this	  experience	  is	  not	  itself	   a	   component	   of	   any	   further	   experience.	   It	   is	   a	  maximal	   property	   of	   you.	  Now	  isolate	  a	  single	  component	  of	  your	  complete	  experience:	  for	  convenience	  let	  it	  be	  the	  visual	  experience	  as	  of	  this	  page,	  a	  largely	  white	  field	  with	  black	  shapes	  across	   it.	   This	   visual	   experience	   of	   the	   white	   and	   black	   page	   is	   a	   ‘qualitative	  element’	   of	   the	   overall	   qualitative	   phenomenal	   field	   you	   enjoy,	   across	   your	  various	  senses	  and	  faculties.	  	  	  What	   is	   notable	   about	   this	   particular	   qualitative	   element,	   which	   goes	   for	   any	  other	  we	  care	  to	  describe,	  is	  that	  we	  specified	  its	  intrinsic	  character	  without	  any	  essential	  reference	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  fact	  enjoying	  it:	  you.	  We	  have	  no	  need,	  in	  the	  normal	   course	   of	   things,	   to	   mention	   the	   subject	   when	   enumerating	   the	  qualitative	   elements	   she	   enjoys.	   You	   are,	   for	   common	   sense	   anyhow,	   the	   only	  subject	  enjoying	  this	  token	  visual	  experience	  of	  this	  page.	  So	  we	  can	  specify	  the	  experience,	   this	   component	   of	   your	   complete	   experience,	   purely	   in	   qualitative	  terms—in	   terms	   of	   the	   qualities	   you	   experience	   in	   having	   it.	   These	   are,	   as	  we	  said,	   something	   like	  a	   field	  of	  white	  and	   smaller	  black	   shapes	   running	  across	   it.	  Thus	  considered	  in	  abstraction	  from—without	  mentioning—the	  fact	  of	  its	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  1890:160.	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enjoyed	  by	  a	  subject,	  the	  experience	  is	  a	  mere	  qualitative	  element	  of	  your	  overall	  experience.	  By	  ‘feeling’	  James	  could	  have	  meant	  this	  sort	  of	  thing.28	  	  But	  when	   James	   speaks	  of	   the	  assembly	  of	   feelings	  producing	   ‘a	   consciousness	  belonging	   to	   the	  group	  as	  such…a	  101st	   feeling’,	   it	   suggests	  a	  different	  sense	  of	  ‘feeling’,	  one	  more	  distant	  from	  everyday	  talk,	   though,	  one	  might	  think,	  a	  sense	  congenial	   to	   panpsychists.	   This	   is	   a	   use	   of	   ‘feeling’	   which	   James	   apparently	  considers	   synonymous	   with	   ‘subject’,	   since	   he	   employs	   the	   terms	   ‘a	  consciousness’	   and	   ‘a	   feeling’	   interchangeably.	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   consciousness	  entails	  its	  being	  like	  something	  for	  someone,	  and	  that	  someone	  is	  a	  subject.	  	  	  	  So,	   on	  one	   reading	   James’s	   ‘feelings’	   are	  qualitative	   elements	   experienced	  by	   a	  subject,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  they	  are	  experiencing	  subjects	  themselves.	  The	  first	  is	  the	   more	   common	   understanding,	   since	   we	   typically	   talk	   about	   the	   feelings	   a	  subject	   enjoys—those	   qualitative	   elements	   ‘before’	   her	   in	   consciousness—without	   bothering	   explicitly	   to	   invoke	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   subject	   herself.	   	  We	  simply	   specify	   these	   elements	   via	   the	   different	   qualities	   they	   exemplify.	  Nota	  
bene:	  There	  is,	  as	  yet,	  no	  insinuation	  that	  qualitative	  elements	  could	  exist	  outside	  of	   being	   experienced	  by	   subjects.	   The	  point	   is	   only	   that	   they	   can	  be	   described	  without	  including	  subjectivity	  into	  the	  description.	  	  Given	   these	   two	  readings	  of	   ‘feeling’,	  we	  now	  have	   two	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  problem	   James	  wants	   to	  highlight.	   Providing	  his	  use	  of	   ‘feeling’	   is	  univocal	  throughout	  the	  quoted	  passage,29	  it	  seems	  James	  either	  claims	  that:	  	  1.	  Qualitative	   elements	   cannot	   be	   assembled	   so	   as	   to	   have	   a	   substantial	   identity	  
with	  their	  product.	  	  or:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  I	  note	  that	  some	  (e.g.	  Kriegel	  2009)	  believe	  there	  to	  be	  a	  distinctive	  ‘me-­‐ness’	  quality	  present	  in	   experience.	   If	   this	   is	   right	   there	   is	   at	   least	   one	   qualitative	   element	   that	   can’t	   be	   specified	  without	  mentioning	  the	  subject.	  I’m	  not	  acquainted	  with	  the	  ‘me-­‐ness’	  quality,	  however.	  29	  Perhaps	  it	  isn’t.	  But	  then	  I	  am	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  difficulty	  James	  has	  in	  mind.	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2.	  Subjects	  of	  experience	  cannot	  be	  assembled	  so	  as	  to	  have	  a	  substantial	   identity	  
with	  their	  product.	  
	  I	  understand	  James’s	  term	  ‘substantial	  identity’	  as	  follows.	  James	  half-­‐unpacks	  it,	  as	  part	  of	  his	  denial	   that	  the	  hundred	  feelings	  could	  form	  a	  substantial	   identity	  with	   the	  one-­‐hundred-­‐and-­‐first,	   by	   saying	   the	  product	   could	  never	  be	  deduced	  from	   its	   antecedents.	   So	   James	  means	  by	   ‘substantial	   identity’	   just	   the	   idea	  we	  have	   been	   operating	  with	   on	   the	   anti-­‐emergentist	   panpsychist’s	   behalf:	   it	   is	   a	  product	  that	  does	  not	  emerge	  from	  its	  ingredients	  (‘emerge’	  in	  the	  bad	  sense	  of	  
strongly	  emerge),30	  but	  which	  is	  perspicuously	  and	  smoothly	  derived	  from	  their	  arrangement:	   a	   structural	   property.	   This	   reading	   is	   reinforced	   by	   James’s	   final	  phrase,	  where	  he	  parses	  a	  substantial	  identity	  as	  an	  item	  that	  intelligibly	  evolves	  from	   its	   antecedents.	   Claim	   1,	   then,	   asserts	   that	   a	   complex	   qualitative	   field	  cannot	  intelligibly	  (non-­‐emergently,	  structurally)	  be	  assembled	  from	  qualitative	  ingredients.	   Claim	   2	   asserts	   that	   a	   macro-­‐subject	   cannot	   intelligibly	   (non-­‐emergently,	  structurally)	  be	  assembled	  from	  micro-­‐subjects.	  	  Before	  assessing	  these	  claims,	  we	  can	  now	  see	  how	  Seager’s	  talk	  of	  the	  ‘problem	  of	   explaining	  how	   complex	   conscious	   states	   emerge	   from	   the	  primitive	  mental	  states’,	   did	   not	   tell	   us	   whether	   the	   challenge	   concerned	   the	   ‘emergence’	  (presumably	   Seager’s	   is	   the	   innocuous	   sense	   of	   ‘emerge	   from’,	   equivalent	   to	  ‘derive	  from’)	  of	  complex	  qualitative	  fields	  from	  simpler	  qualitative	  ingredients,	  or	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   higher-­‐level	   subject	   from	   subject-­‐components.	   The	  Jamesian	   ambiguity	   is	   also	   present,	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree,	   in	   Goff’s	   work	   on	   the	  combination	   problem.	   Though	  Goff	   tends	   to	   avoid	   ambiguous	   formulations,	   he	  does	   fluctuate	   between	   describing	   the	   difficulty	   in	   quality-­‐based	   and	   subject-­‐based	   terms,	   even	   within	   the	   same	   article.	   Perhaps	   he	   is	   best	   understood	   as	  holding	   that	   both	   aspects	   of	   the	   combination	   problem	   are	   equally	   serious	   for	  panpsychists.31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For,	  recall,	  weak	  emergents	  are	  in	  principle	  fully	  explicable.	  31	  Goff’s	   2006,	   for	   instance,	   employs	   the	   example	   of	   the	   combination	   of	   ten	   slight	   pains	   into	   a	  single	   severe	   pain.	   At	   times	   Goff	   talks	   as	   if	   the	   problem	   is	   understanding	   the	   qualitative	  combination	  (since	  ten	  slight	  pains	  are	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  one	  severe	  pain)	  and	  elsewhere	  he	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I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  this	  is	  so,	  however—that	  both	  problems	  are	  equally	  serious.	  The	   reason	   is	   that	   there	   is	   simply	   no	   ‘combination	   problem’	   as	   concerns	   the	  assembly	   of	   qualitative	   instances	   into	   a	   qualitative	   whole.	   There	   is	   little	  challenging	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   taking	   ingredients,	   each	  with	   a	   certain	   qualitative	  character,	  and	  putting	  them	  together	  into	  a	  whole	  whose	  macroscopic	  qualitative	  character	  is	  the	  intelligible	  product	  of	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  components	  plus	  their	  arrangement.	   There	   are	   a	   few	   different	   relevant	   conceptual	   models	   we	   have	  available	   from	   everyday	   life,	   and	   it	   might	   be	   that	   phenomenal	   qualitative	  combination	   conforms	   to	   any	   one	   (or	   more)	   of	   these.	   Again,	   phenomenal	  qualitative	  combination	  may	  have	  its	  own	  rules;	  but	  there	  seems	  little	  reason	  to	  think	  there	  is	  anything	  much	  more	  conceptually	  challenging	  in	  such	  combination	  than	  there	  is	  in	  the	  everyday	  models	  of	  qualitative	  combination.32	  	  We	   considered	   already	   a	  merely	   additive	  model,	   on	  which	   the	   qualities	   of	   the	  composite	  are	  simply	  the	  organized	  set	  of	  those	  instantiated	  by	  its	  components.	  Our	   illustrative	   analogy	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   combination	   was	   a	   painting’s	  composition	   by	   qualitatively	   distinct,	   determinate	   paint	   patches.	   Perhaps	  phenomenal	  qualitative	  combination	  is	  like	  this.	  Of	  course,	  the	  additive	  model	  is	  simplistic,	  even	  as	  regards	  building	  a	  painting.	  In	  painting	  an	  important	  element,	  something	   the	  artist	  spends	  considerable	   time	  on,	   is	   the	  blending	  of	  qualitative	  instances.	   A	   red	   patch	  mixed	  with	   a	   dab	   of	   blue	  will	   give	   purple,	  wherein	   the	  antecedent	   qualitative	   instances	   survive	   in	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	   blend.	  Variously	  colored	  rays	  of	  light	  blend	  differently	  (as	  common	  sense	  views	  things):	  here	  the	  blending	  of	  the	  various	  qualities	  gives	  white—in	  painting	  it	  gives	  black.	  Some	  such	  blending	  mechanism	  will	  surely	  be	  an	  important	  component	  of	  micro-­‐quality	   combination	   into	  macro-­‐qualia.	   In	   any	  of	   these	   cases	   just	   considered—additive,	  or	  blending,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  both—a	  synchronous	  snapshot	  of	  the	  composite	   can	   be	   intelligibly	   related	   to	   its	   component	   qualitative	   elements,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  seems	   to	   suggest	   that	  what	   blocks	   combination	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   each	   pain	   is	   associated	  with	   a	  distinct	  subject.	  	  32	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  the	  rules	  will	  be	  graspable	  just	  from	  consideration	  of	  uncombined	  qualitative	  ingredients.	  We	  had	  to	  study	  chemical	  reactions	  to	  understand	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  NaCl	  from	  its	  antecedents,	  for	  example	  (at	  the	  time	  he	  writes,	  Broad	  1925	  considers	  chemical	  properties	   emergent).	   But	   after	   the	   fact	   we	   are	   able	   to	   see	   how	   the	   high-­‐level	   properties	   are	  structurally	  produced.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  same	  for	  macro-­‐qualitative	  combination.	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which	  can	  be	   readily	   conceived	  as	  persisting	  via	   the	  ongoing	  contribution	   they	  make	   to	   the	  new	  quality	   instantiated	   (take	   the	  blueness	   away	   from	   the	  purple	  paint-­‐dab	  and	  you	  are	  left	  with	  red,	  altering	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  whole).	  There	  is,	  in	  short,	   no	   serious	   difficulty	   associated	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   complex	  macroscopic	  qualitative	  state	  being	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  set	  of	  simpler	  quality	  instances.	  The	  first	   Jamesian	  combination	  problem,	  then,	   is	  no	  real	  problem	  at	  all.	  For	  homely	  confirmation	   of	   this,	   we	   can	   think	   about	   the	   way	   we	   easily	   understand	   the	  combination	  of	  the	  various	  flavours	  we	  taste	  in	  a	  meal	  into	  a	  gustatory	  gestalt.	  	  	  What	   of	   the	   second	   putative	   problem,	   concerning	   the	   combination	   of	   subjects	  into	  a	  ‘larger’	  subject?	  This	  is	  the	  real	  combination	  problem.	  
	  
5.	  Subjects	  do	  not	  Combine	  Goff	   argues	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   set	   of	   subjects,	   however	   arranged,	   never	   a	  
priori	   entails	   the	   existence	   of	   another	   subject,	   thus	   panpsychism’s	   explanatory	  project	   falters.33	  Goff	   is	   correct,	   but	   the	   situation	   for	   panpsychists	   is	   far	  worse	  than	  he	  estimates,	  both	  epistemically	  and	  metaphysically.	  By	  Goff’s	  argument	  we	  cannot	   see	   how	   the	   combination	   of	   micro-­‐subjects	   could	   provide	   for	   the	  existence	   of	   a	  macro-­‐subject.	   I	   argue	   that	  we	   can	   see	  how	   the	   combination	   of	  micro-­‐subjects	   could	   not	   provide	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   macro-­‐subject.	   The	  combination	  of	  subjects	  is	  a	  demonstrably	  incoherent	  notion,	  not	  just	  one	  lacking	  in	  a	  priori	  intelligibility	  or	  evident	  necessity.	  Goff’s	  epistemic	  argument	  leaves	  it	  open	  that	  subjects	  might	  combine	  as	  the	  panpsychist	  envisages;	  my	  metaphysical	  argument	   rules	   this	   out,	   thus	   ruling	   out	   constitutive	   panpsychism.	   Before	  proceeding	  with	   the	  argument,	  we	  need	  to	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	   the	  concept	  of	  combination,	  and	  how	  we	  understand	  subjects	  of	  experience.	  	  	  Earlier	   we	   connected	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   subject	   with	   that	   of	   a	   point	   of	   view.34	  Neither	  notion	   is	  easy	   to	  get	  a	  grip	  on,	  but	  noting	  one	  or	   two	  basic	   features	  of	  each	  will	  help	  to	  make	  their	  interrelation	  clear	  enough	  for	  present	  purposes.	  The	  idea	   of	   being	   a	   subject	   goes	   with	   being	   an	   experiential	   entity,	   something	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Goff	  2009.	  	  34	  A	  conceptual	  connection	  salient	  in	  Nagel’s	  work,	  for	  example	  the	  second	  half	  of	  his	  1979.	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conscious	   of	   phenomenal	   qualities.	   That	   a	   given	   subject	   has	   a	   particular	  phenomenological	   point	   of	   view	   can	   be	   taken	   as	   saying	   that	   there	   exists	   a	  discrete	   ‘sphere’	   of	   conscious-­‐experiential	   goings-­‐on	   corresponding	   to	   this	  subject,	   with	   regard	   to	   which	   other	   subjects	   are	   distinct	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  phenomenal	  qualities	  they	  experience,	  and	  they	  have	  no	  direct	  (i.e.	  experiential)	  access	  to	  the	  qualitative	  field	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  first	  subject.	  A	  subject,	  then,	  can	  be	  thought	   of	   as	   a	   point	   of	   view	   annexed	   to	   a	   private	   qualitative	   field	   (this	   is	   a	  conceptual	   bifurcation	   for	   now—these	   aspects	   may	   be	   metaphysically	  inextricable).	   A	   thought	   experiment	   will	   exhibit	   the	   interrelation	   between	   a	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view	  and	  those	  qualities	  within	  her	  experiential	  ambit.	  Imagine	  a	  hundred	  qualitatively	  identical	  subjects	  at	  the	  ‘starting	  line’	  of	  existence—their	  only	   difference	   is	   that	   they	   occupy	   distinct	   positions	   in	   space-­‐time.	   They	   are	  about	   to	   set	   out	   on	   their	   lives.	   As	   time	   winds	   on,	   each	   takes	   a	   unique	   path	  through	   the	   environment,	   and	   is	   impinged	   upon	   differently.	   These	   different	  impingings	   result	   in	   different	   modifications	   of	   each	   sensory	   field.	   Thus	   each	  subjectival	  perspective	  has	  access	  to	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  array	  of	  qualia,	  as	  compared	  with	   other	   subjects,	   over	   its	   lifetime.	   It	   is	   the	   fact	   of	   these	   different	  points	   of	   view,	   these	   differently	   located	   ‘lookouts’	   on	   the	   world,	   that	   then	  grounds	  the	  character	  of	  the	  peculiar	  set	  of	  qualities	  each	  subject	  experiences	  at	  a	  given	  time.35	  	  	  Our	  template	   for	  combination	   is	   the	  assembly	  of	   two	  hydrogen	  and	  one	  oxygen	  atom	  into	  a	  molecule	  of	  water.	  First	  we’ll	  consider	  the	  combination	  in	  particular-­‐terms,	  then	  in	  property-­‐terms.	  These	  two	  modes	  function	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  reason	  being	  that	  they	  operate	  in	  parallel:	  combination	  of	  particulars	  occurs	  thanks	   to	   the	   integration	   of	   their	   properties,	   and	   combination	   of	   properties	  occurs	   as	   the	   bearers	   of	   the	   properties	   are	   combined.	   When	   hydrogen	   and	  oxygen	  atoms	  combine	   into	  water	   they	  bond	  covalently,	   sharing	  electrons.	  The	  oxygen	   atom	   completes	   its	   outer	   shell	   by	   borrowing	   an	   electron	   from	   each	  hydrogen.	   Thus	   the	   three	   atoms	   are	   deformed,	   intrinsically	   modified,	   by	  participating	   in	   the	   combination	   of	   water.	   Yet,	   importantly,	   all	   three	   atoms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Cf.	  Russell’s	  ‘cameras’	  (1927b:122).	  What	  must	  also	  help	  fix	  the	  range	  of	  qualities	  a	  subject	  is	  capable	  of	  is	  the	  subject’s	  own	  physical	  constitution.	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continue	  to	  exist	  once	  combination	   is	  achieved.	  Their	  union	  modifies	  them,	  but	  they	  survive	  in	  the	  whole,	  making	  an	  ongoing	  contribution	  to	  its	  nature.	  This	  is	  clear	  enough,	  for	  were	  we	  to	  remove	  one	  of	  the	  hydrogens	  (say)	  the	  result	  would	  be	   destruction	   of	   the	  water	  molecule.	   Combination,	   thus,	   is	   the	   formation	   of	   a	  whole	   from	  components	  where	   the	  components	  continue	   to	  exist	   in	   the	  whole,	  but	  are	  intrinsically	  altered	  by	  combining	  with	  one	  another.	  This	  is	  as	  against	  a	  mere	  aggregation	  of	  items,	  which	  need	  not	  condition	  or	  unite	  those	  items	  in	  any	  way.	  Other	  intuitive	  examples	  are	  the	  combination	  of	  qualitatively	  and	  spatially	  distinct	  paint	  patches	  into	  a	  painting,	  and	  the	  combination	  of	  cooking	  ingredients	  into	  a	  meal.	  The	  survival	  of	  the	  components	  is	  entailed	  by	  saying	  the	  product	  is	  their	   combination	   or	   union,	   as	   opposed	   to	   being	   merely	   their	   effect	   or	  descendant.	  	  Turning	   now	   to	   properties:	   a	   combination	   or	   unity	   possesses	   novel	   systemic	  
powers.	  A	  water	  molecule	  forms	  a	  dipole:	  its	  charge	  is	  ‘two-­‐faced’,	  being	  negative	  towards	   the	   oxygen	   side	   and	   positive	   towards	   the	   hydrogen	   side.	   This	   feature	  accounts	   for	   the	   way	   water	   molecules	   bond,	   and	   water’s	   boiling	   point.	   An	  aggregate’s	   powers,	   by	   contrast,	   are	   a	  mere	   jumble	   of	   the	   powers	   of	   its	   parts.	  	  	  What	   is	   the	   relationship	   of	   a	   unity’s	   new	   systemic	   power	   to	   the	   powers	   of	   its	  isolated,	   pre-­‐combination	   parts?	   The	   distinctive	   power	   of	   the	   combination	   is	  novel,	   in	   that	   none	   of	   its	   parts	   possesses	   it.	   It	   is	   not	   however	   an	   autonomous	  higher-­‐level	   power,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   inexplicable	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  powers	  of	  the	  parts.	  Such	  autonomous	  higher-­‐level	  powers	  are	  characteristic	  of	  emergents.	  The	  systemic	  powers	  of	  unities	  are,	  rather,	  structural	  properties.	  The	  dipolar	  property	  of	  a	  water	  molecule	  is	  intelligible	  as	  the	  interactive	  organization	  of	   the	   charges	   of	   its	   constituent	   atoms:	   these	   charges	   are	   arranged	   so	   they	  interact	  (thus	  altering	  their	  bearers	  intrinsically—electrons	  become	  prised	  away	  and	  shared),	  and	  the	  upshot	  of	  their	  interaction,	  their	  combination	  as	  charges,	  is	  the	   dipolarity	   of	   the	   molecule.	   The	   electrons	   loaned	   to	   the	   molecule	   by	   the	  hydrogens	  spend	  most	  time	  around	  the	  oxygen	  atom,	  giving	  this	  side	  a	  relatively	  negative	   charge,	   and	   the	   hydrogen	   side	   a	   relatively	   positive	   charge.	   As	   with	  particular-­‐combination,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  pre-­‐combination	  ingredients—	  here	  properties—survive	   in	   the	   unity:	   the	   charges	   of	   the	   pre-­‐combination	   atoms,	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though	  modified	  by	  combining,	  survive	  in	  the	  ongoing	  contribution	  they	  make	  to	  the	  polarity	  of	  the	  molecule.	  If	  any	  of	  those	  charges	  ceased	  to	  exist,	  the	  molecule	  could	  not	  have	  the	  dipolarity	  it	  actually	  manifests.	  	  	  If	  micro-­‐subjects	  combined	  into	  macro-­‐subjects,	  then,	  what	  we	  should	  anticipate	  is	   their	   coming	   together	   closely	   enough	   to	   interact,	   thereby	   modifying	   their	  properties,	  whilst	   all	   the	  while	   they	   survived	   in	   the	  whole	   they	   formed.	   Their	  persistence	  in	  the	  whole	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  ongoing	  contribution,	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  natures,	  to	  the	  product,	  as	  with	  atoms	  in	  a	  water	  molecule.	  The	  constitutive	  panpsychist	  posits	   subjectivity—which	  we	  analysed	  as	   the	  having	  of	  a	  point	  of	  view	   to	   which	   qualities	   are	   present—as	   a	   fundamental	   feature	   of	   matter,	   the	  model	   being	   other	   fundamental	   properties	   like	   mass	   and	   charge.	   Now,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   note	   that	   basic	   mass	   and	   charge	   are	   directly	   relevant	   to	   their	  higher-­‐level	  instantiations.	  The	  mass	  of	  a	  helium	  atomic	  nucleus	  is	  the	  mass	  of	  its	  two	  protons	  and	  two	  neutrons,	  minus	  the	  energy	  used	  to	  bond	  them	  together	  (a	  good	  example	  of	   combination).	  We	  have	  already	  seen	   that	  a	  H2O’s	  dipolarity	   is	  the	   product	   of	   the	   charges	   of	   its	   atomic	   parts;	   their	   charges	   in	   turn	   are	   the	  product	  of	  those	  pertaining	  to	  their	  subatomic	  constituents,	  and	  so	  on	  down	  to	  the	   fundamental	   level.	   The	   same	   pattern	   goes	   for	   instantiations	   of	   mass	   and	  charge	   at	   higher	   levels	   of	   being:	   both	   are	  ultimately	   the	   result	   of	  mass/charge	  interactions	  at	  lower	  levels,	  down	  to	  the	  ultimates.	  In	  a	  way	  the	  very	  reason	  for	  the	  positing	  of	  fundamental	  mass	  and	  charge	  has	  been	  to	  account	  for	  higher-­‐level	  instantiations	  of	  these	  properties,	  those	  directly	  observable	  by	  us.	  Similarly,	  with	  subjectivity	   a	   high-­‐level	   feature	   manifest	   to	   us,	   the	   constitutive	   panpsychist	  posits	  fundamental	  subjectivity	  to	  account	  for	  these	  high-­‐level	  instances.	  For	  this	  to	  work,	   fundamental	   instances	  of	  subjectivity—ultimate-­‐subjects—would	  have	  to	   ‘add	   up	   to’	   bigger	   subjects,	   as	   fundamental	   charges	   and	   masses	   produce	  higher-­‐level	  instances	  of	  these	  properties.	  	  	  But	   this	  cannot	  work,	   simply	  because	  points	  of	  view	  cannot	  combine.	  Consider	  two	  micro-­‐subjects,	   eager	   for	   combination	   into	   a	   higher-­‐level	   individual.	   How	  might	   they	   combine?	   Since	   this	   is	   combination,	   we	   want	   the	   ingredients	   to	  survive	   in	   the	   whole.	   Just	   as	   atoms	   are	   not	   obliterated,	   only	   deformed,	   in	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building	  a	  molecule,	  subjects	  would	  have	  to	  persist	  as	  such	  within	  their	  higher-­‐level	   product.	   This	  means	  we	   can	   rule	   out	   immediately	   a	   scenario	  where	   after	  integration	   just	   a	   single	   subject	   exists.	   If	   one	   subject	   is	   left	  where	   formerly	  we	  had	  two,	  this	  means	  at	  least	  one	  subject	  has	  gone	  out	  of	  existence,	  which	  is	  not	  combination	   but	   a	   fight	   to	   the	   death.	   It	   doesn’t	   improve	   matters	   if	   we	   try	   to	  imagine	   the	   two	  original	   subjects	   as	   somehow	  each	   contributing	   a	   ‘quantity	   of	  point-­‐of-­‐view-­‐edness’	   to	   the	   surviving	   subject.36	  For	   the	   two	   to	   survive	   in	   the	  whole	  as	  subjects,	   there	  would	  have	  to	  persist	  (at	   least)	  two	  points	  of	  view.	  Yet	  by	  hypothesis	  we	  have	  a	  single	  subjective	  point	  of	  view	  left	  over.	  Thus	  one	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  corresponding	  subject,	  has	  wholly	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  There’s	  really	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘quantity’	  of	  point-­‐of-­‐view-­‐edness,	  or	  perspective.	  Points	  of	  view	  are	   binary	   entities:	   they	   exist	   either	   wholly	   or	   not	   at	   all.	   Talk	   of	   subjects	  contributing	  quantities	  of	  point-­‐of-­‐view-­‐edness	  to	  other	  subjects	  could	  really	  only	  mean	  the	  contribution	  of	  experiential	  contents:	  Perhaps	  by	  telepathy	  you	  could	  add	  to	  my	  stock	  of	  experienced	  qualitative	  elements,	  by	  giving	  me	  access	  to	  your	  chocolate-­‐qualia.	  But	  this	  isn’t	  to	  add	  any	  of	  your	  perspective	  to	  mine,	  only	  to	  add	  a	  bit	  of	  what	  yours	  is	  a	  perspective	  on.	  Let’s	  stipulate	  that	  the	  singleton	  successor	  to	  our	  micro-­‐subject	  pair	  requires	  the	  donation	  of	  one	  of	  its	  predecessors’	  points	  of	   view,	   so	   there’s	   a	   point	   of	   view	   around	   after	   integration.	   But	   with	   this	  contribution	  made,	  there’s	  nothing	  for	  the	  other	  original	  micro-­‐subject	  to	  add	  to	  the	  successor	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  having	  a	  point	  of	  view,	  on	  this	  scenario	  where	  we	  end	  up	  with	  a	  single	  unified	  perspective.	  All	  that	  seems	  required	  of	  her,	  qua	  point	  of	  view,	  is	  her	  quiet	  disappearance.	  What	  could	  this	  point	  of	  view	  now	  add	  to	  her	  successor	  except	  her	  subjective	  diversity,	  which	  would	  precisely	  be	  disruptive	  of	  its	   one-­‐ness?	  Thus	   if	   one	   point	   of	   view	   remains	   at	   least	   one	   point	   of	   view	  has	  been	  eliminated,37	  which	  is	  not	  combination.38	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Thanks	  to	  a	  reviewer	  for	  this	  suggestion.	  37	  Whether	  both	  of	  the	  original	  points	  of	  view	  are	  eliminated	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  construe	  the	  survivor	  as	  identical	  to	  one	  of	  the	  originals,	  or	  as	  a	  descendant	  inheriting	  a	  point	  of	  view.	  But	  since	  points	  of	  view	  correspond	  to	  subjects,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  survivor	  will	  be	  identical	  with	  one	  of	  the	  originals:	  whosoever	  donates	  the	  surviving	  point	  of	  view.	  	  38	  The	  proposal	  that	  some	  subjects	  are	  eliminated	  in	  combination	  might	  not	  seem	  so	  terrible	  to	  panpsychists,	   even	   if	   it	   doesn’t	   qualify	   as	   ‘combination’	   under	   our	   rubric.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   I	  explain	  why	  this	  option	  (unacceptably)	  implies	  emergentism.	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The	   two	   original	   points	   of	   view	  must	   survive	   in	   combination.	   But	  we	   can	   also	  rule	   out	   a	   scenario	  where	  precisely	   their	   two	  points	   of	   view	   remain.	  What	  we	  wanted	  was	   to	   assemble	   our	   two	   subjects	   so	   as	   to	   constitute	   a	  unified	   higher-­‐level	   subject,	   with	   its	   own	   point	   of	   view.	   If	   we	   are	   left	   with	   all	   and	   only	   the	  original	  pair	  of	  points	  of	  view	  then	  we	  still	  have	  a	  multitude,	  and	  are	  nowhere	  nearer	  to	  the	  genuine	  combination	  of	  subjectivities	  into	  one	  subject.	  This	  would	  be	  so	  even	  were	  both	  subjects	  for	  some	  reason	  to	  experience	  just	  the	  same	  range	  of	  qualities	  for	  a	  time.	  There	  would	  still	  be	  two	  distinct	  token	  experiencings	  of—perspectives	  on—these	  qualities.	  	  	  The	   serious	   constitutive	   panpsychist	   proposal,	   therefore,	   is	   this:	   integration	   of	  our	  two	  subjects	  must	  produce	  a	  third	  subject.	  Might	  this	  represent	  some	  sort	  of	  overarching	  ‘über-­‐subject’,	  comprising	  as	  constituents	  the	  two	  antecedent	  points	  of	   view,	  which	   survive	   in	   the	  whole?	   As	   regards	   experiential	   contents,	   we	   can	  imagine	  the	  über-­‐subject’s	  experiential	   field	  to	  be	  the	  qualitative	  product	  of	   the	  experiential	  contents	  of	  the	  originals,	  according	  to	  our	  best	  model	  of	  qualitative	  combination.	   If	   one	   antecedent	   subject	   experiences	   a	   unitary	   phenomenal	  blueness,	   the	   other	   redness,	   the	   über-­‐subject	   experiences	   both	   colors,	   perhaps	  blended	  into	  a	  purple	  block,	  or	  as	  stripes.	  	  	  Yet	  we	  are	  still	  no	  closer	  to	  combining	  points	  of	  view,	  even	  if	  we	  have	  made	  some	  ground	   in	   integrating	  experiential	   contents.	  Under	   this	   scenario	  we	  have	   three	  points	  of	  view	  in	  play—those	  of	  the	  original	  duo,	  plus	  that	  of	  the	  new	  subject.	  Is	  it	   possible	   to	   understand	   the	   original	   two	  points	   of	   view	  as	  components	   of	   the	  third?	   It	   is	   not.	   Here	   are	   two	   ways	   to	   see	   this,	   both	   of	   which	   bear	   out	   the	  essential	  discreteness	  of	  subject-­‐perspectives:	  	  Consider	   the	   original	   duo’s	   points	   of	   view.	   One—Blue’s—is	   pervaded	   by	   a	  unitary	  blueness,	   the	  other—Red’s—by	  redness,	  and	  that	   is	  all	   they	  experience,	  respectively.	   To	   say	   these	   points	   of	   view	   were	   present	   as	   components	   in	   the	  experiential	  perspective	  of	  the	  über-­‐subject	  (‘Ub’)	  would	  therefore	  be	  to	  say	  that	  
Ub	   experienced	   a	   unitary	   phenomenal	   blueness	   and	   a	   unitary	   phenomenal	  redness,	   i.e.	  had	  synchronous	  experiences	  as	  of	  each	  of	  these	  qualities	  alone,	  to	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the	   exclusion	   of	   all	   others.	   For	   it	   is	   these	   qualities	   each	   on	   their	   own	   that	  characterise,	   respectively,	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   original	   duo.	   Experience	  excludes,	  as	  well	  as	  includes.	  Yet	  nowhere	  does	  Ub	  have	  any	  such	  experiences:	  he	  precisely	  combines	  his	  predecessors’	  qualitative	  experiential	  contents.	  Ub	  doesn’t	  experience	   red-­‐to-­‐the-­‐exclusion-­‐of-­‐(blue-­‐and)-­‐all-­‐else,	   nor	   blue-­‐to-­‐the-­‐exclusion-­‐of-­‐(red-­‐and)-­‐all-­‐else,	   let	   alone—impossibly—both	   together.	   Thus	   the	  original	   points	   of	   view	   are	   not	   ingredients	   in	   Ub’s	   subjectivity.	   Only	   their	  contents—the	  redness	  and	  blueness—are.	  There	  are	  some	  deceptive	  conceptual	  possibilities	  in	  the	  neighborhood:	  We	  might	  imagine,	  first,	  Ub	  with	  ‘stereoscopic’	  vision—two	  visual	  fields,	  one	  filled	  with	  blue,	  the	  other	  with	  red.	  But	  that	  is	  one	  point	  of	  view	  experiencing	  blue	  and	  red	  conjunctively,	  nothing	   like	  the	  original	  two	  points	  of	  view.	   If	   these	  visual	   fields	  are	  genuinely	  experientially	   separated,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   i.e.	   not	   given	   to	   the	   same	   consciousness,	   then	  we	   just	   have	  two	  separate	  subjects,	  much	  as	  if	  Ub	  never	  came	  to	  be.	  We	  might	  also	  imagine	  Ub	  experiencing	  all	  and	  only	  blue,	  then	  all	  and	  only	  red,	  in	  series.	  But	  that,	  while	  it	  might	  (perhaps)	  count	  as	  occupying	  now	  Red’s	  point	  of	  view,	  now	  Blue’s,	  is	  not	  to	  have	  their	  two	  points	  of	  view	  synchronously	  compose	  Ub’s	  point	  of	  view,	  which	  is	  what	  combination	  requires.39	  	  
	  Another	  way	  to	  see	  that	  the	  original	  points	  of	  view	  don’t	  compose	  the	  third	  is	  to	  imagine	   subtracting	   one	   of	   them.	   Recall	   that	   in	   a	   combination	   removal	   of	   a	  component	   compromises	   the	   whole—in	   removing	   a	   hydrogen	   from	   H2O	   we	  destroy	  the	  molecule.	  Now	  imagine	  Red	  disappears.	  Will	  Ub	  notice?	  It	  seems	  he	  need	   not:	   provided	   Red’s	   experiential	   content—the	   relevant	   portion	   of	  phenomenal	   redness	  which	  Ub	   is	   experiencing—remains,	  what	   it	   is	   like	   for	  Ub	  won’t	   change.	   Thus	   Red’s	   point	   of	   view	   did	   not	   phenomenally	   compose	   Ub’s.	  	  Someone	  might	  object	  that	  if	  Red	  disappears,	  so	  does	  her	  experiential	  content,	  so	  
Ub	   must	   lose	   the	   redness	   from	   his	   experience—his	   purple	   experience	   will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  It’s	  true	  that	  in	  describing	  combination	  we	  noted	  that	  constituents	  are	  modified	  in	  combining,	  so	   it	  may	   be	   unduly	   artificial	   here	   to	   consider	  Red	  and	  Blue’s	   pre-­‐combination	   perspectives	   in	  unmodified	  form	  (i.e.	  as	  filled	  with	  unitary	  red	  and	  unitary	  blue,	  respectively).	  Perhaps	  the	  right	  picture	  has	  Red	  and	  Blue	   interacting	  to	  produce	  Ub,	  with	  all	  three	  now	  experiencing	  purple.	  But	  this	  does	  nothing	  to	  get	  around	  the	  problem	  the	  artificial	  setup	  serves	  to	  highlight:	  if	  the	  subjects	  survive,	   as	   they	   must,	   there	   will	   be	   three	   actual	   experiencings	   of	   purple.	   It’s	   not	   possible	   to	  imagine	   Ub’s	   unified	   point	   of	   view	   as	   comprising	   two	   synchronous	   experiencings	   of	   purple	  (pertaining	  to	  the	  perspectives	  of	  Red	  and	  Blue).	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devolve	   to	   blue.	   But	   that	   would	   at	   best	   prove	   Red’s	   experiential	   content	   was	  integrated	   in	   Ub’s.	   It	   does	   nothing	   to	   show	   that	   Red’s	   very	   perspective	   was	   a	  component	   of	   Ub’s	   perspective.	   Indeed,	   if	   Red’s	   point	   of	   view	   did	   partially	  compose	   Ub’s,	   then	   Red’s	   disappearance	   should	   make	   more	   of	   a	   phenomenal	  difference	  to	  Ub	  than	  the	  mere	  loss	  of	  the	  red	  content.	  For	  that	  loss	  is	  achievable	  just	  by	  Red’s	  reaching	  a	  ‘zen	  state’	  of	  pure	  ‘contentless’	  experience,	  without	  Red	  as	  a	  point	  of	  view	  departing	  the	  scene.	  We	  might	  additionally	  stipulate	  that	  Ub’s	  existence	  depends	  on	  Red’s	  (plus	  Blue’s),	  so	  that	  if	  Red’s	  point	  of	  view	  disappears	  
Ub	  dies	  off.	  But	  that’s	  as	  close	  as	  we	  can	  get—dependence	  is	  not	  constitution.	  No	  sense	   is	   to	   be	   made	   of	   points	   of	   view	   literally	   composing,	   as	   points	   of	   view,	  another	  point	  of	  view.	  	  Whatever	  the	  relationship	  between	  Ub’s	  experience	  and	  those	  of	  the	  original	  duo	  as	  regards	  content,	  it	  seems	  Ub	  as	  the	  bearer	  of	  a	  point	  of	  view	  can	  never	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  micro-­‐subjects,	  even	  if	  he	  is	  after	  some	  manner	  their	  product	  (by	  James’s	  ‘curious	  physical	  law’).	  While	  the	  qualitative	  contents	  of	  consciousness	  may	   perhaps	   combine,	   consciousnesses	   themselves—subjects—cannot:	  this	  is	  precluded	  by	  the	  metaphysical	  logic	  of	  points	  of	  view.40	  	  
6.	  From	  Constitutive	  Panpsychism	  to	  Emergentism	  
Must	  micro-­‐subjects	  survive	   in	   the	  higher-­‐level	  subject?	  Perhaps	   it	  wouldn’t	  be	  ‘combination’,	  as	  defined,	  but	  what	  would	  be	  wrong	  with	  the	  antecedent	  subjects	  generating	  the	  über-­‐subject	  and	  in	  the	  process	  going	  out	  of	  existence?	  Then	  their	  various	  points	  of	  view	  wouldn’t	  be	  around	  to	  stick	  out	  like	  such	  sore	  thumbs	  for	  the	  single-­‐perspective	  macro-­‐subjectivity	  we	  aim	  to	  construct.	  	  Panpsychists	   inclined	   to	   reply	   thus	   have	   something	   like	   Humphreys’	   fusion	   in	  mind.41	  Humphreys	   offers	   fusion	   as	   a	   model	   of	   the	   generation	   of	   higher-­‐level	  items	   by	   sets	   of	   lower-­‐level	   items.	   The	   lower-­‐level	   items	   ‘fuse’	   together,	  producing	   the	   higher-­‐level	   item,	   and	   in	   the	   process	   are	   obliterated.	   All	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Nagel	   apparently	   spies	   the	  problem:	   ‘How	   could	   a	   single	   self	   be	   composed	  of	  many	   selves?’	  (1979:194).	  The	  preceding	  section,	  and	  the	  next,	  seek	  to	  bring	  Nagel’s	  difficulty	  into	  focus.	  	  41	  Humphreys	  1997.	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remains	  in	  existence	  is	  the	  higher-­‐level	  product.	  In	  this	  vein,	  panpsychists	  might	  propose	  that	  lower-­‐level	  subjects	  fuse	  to	  form	  one	  higher-­‐level	  subject,	  a	  subject	  like	  one	  of	  us.	  After	  fusion,	  what	  remains	  is	  the	  single	  higher-­‐level	  subject,	  with	  the	  lower-­‐level	  subjects	  of	  the	  ‘fusion-­‐base’	  having	  ceased	  to	  exist.42	  This	  seems	  what	  Seager	  intends	  with	  his	  concept	  of	  panpsychic	  ‘combinatorial	  fusion’,43	  and	  Goff	  briefly	  entertains	  the	  same	  idea:	  	  	   Perhaps	   the	  parts	  of	  my	  brain,	  before	   they	  came	   together	   to	   form	  my	   brain,	   had	   their	   own	   individual	   phenomenal	   lives.	   But	   when	  they…form	  my	  brain	  they	  lose	  their	  individual	  conscious	  identities,	  and	  somehow	  morph	  into	  o-­‐experience	  had	  by	  the	  whole	  brain.44	  
 
 But	   fusion	  cannot	  help	   the	  panpsychist.	  The	  problem	   lies	   in	  something	  already	  emphasised:	   the	   essentially	   isolated	   nature	   of	   individual	   subjects	   with	   their	  independent	   experiential	   points	   of	   view.	   This	   feature	   of	   subjects	   ensures	   their	  fusion	   could	   only	   provide	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   macro-­‐subject,	   implying	   a	  violation	  of	  panpsychism’s	  core	  metaphysical	  commitments.	  To	  see	  why	  this	   is,	  we	   must	   further	   examine	   the	   constitution	   of	   structural	   (i.e.	   non-­‐emergent)	  properties.	  	  Consider	  as	  a	  possible	  case	  of	  fusion	  the	  melting	  of	  several	  gold	  ingots	  into	  one	  big	  gold	  lump.	  The	  masses	  of	  the	  ingots	  fuse:	  Each	  ingot	  has	  its	  own	  mass	  before	  melting,	  but	  having	  been	  formed	  into	  one	  chunk	  of	  gold,	  these	  individual	  masses	  no	   longer	  exist.	  Only	   the	  mass	  of	   the	  whole	  exists,	   formed	  by	   the	   fusion	  of	   the	  antecedent	   ingots	   and	   their	   respective	   masses.45	  What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	  this.	   In	   general,	   to	   avoid	   emergence,	   lower-­‐level	   properties	  must	   contribute	   to	  their	  novel	  product	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  metaphysical	  nature,	  or,	  otherwise	  put,	  while	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Humphreys	  allows	  fusion	  of	  properties	  and	  fusion	  of	  things.	  43	  ‘Perhaps	  we	  can	  regard	  the	  parts	  as	  infusing	  their	  properties	  into	  the	  whole	  and	  by	  so	  doing	  effacing	  themselves.’	  (MS:14).	  44	  2009:308.	  	  45	  Someone	  might	   dispute	   this	   as	   an	   example	   of	   fusion—it	   might	   be	   thought	   the	  mass	   of	   the	  chunk	   is	   a	   straightforward	   combination:	  perhaps	   the	  product	  of	   the	   (persisting)	  masses	  of	   the	  ingots,	   or	   the	  masses	   of	   constituent	   gold	  molecules,	  which	   certainly	   do	   not	   cease	   to	   exist.	   Not	  much	  hangs	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  case,	  however.	  The	  example	  is	  only	  illustrative	  of	  the	  deeper	  point	  developed	  below:	  that	  for	  a	  structural	  (i.e.	  non-­‐emergent)	  property	  to	  result,	  whether	  by	  fusion	  or	  otherwise,	   there	  needs	   to	  be	   an	   intelligible	  contribution	   by	   the	   antecedent	  properties	   to	   the	  product.	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remaining	   true	   to	  what	   they	   are.	   In	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   structural	   property,	   its	  lower-­‐level	   antecedent	   properties,	   belonging	   to	   multiple	   lower-­‐level	   bearers,	  interact	   with	   one	   another	   due	   to	   their	   character,	   and	   the	   upshot	   of	   this	   self-­‐expressive	  interaction	  is	  the	  higher-­‐level	  property.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  requirement	  of	   metaphysical	   sense-­‐making	   in	   the	   production	   of	   a	   structural	   property.	  Antecedents	   generate	   the	   novel	   structure	   by	   interacting	   according	   to,	   and	  abiding	   by,	   what	   they	   already	   are—so	   that	   there	   is	   a	   corresponding	   lack	   of	  surprise	   in	   the	  product:	   it	   is	   intelligible.	   If	  we	   look	  back	   to	   the	  anti-­‐emergence	  principle	   as	   expressed	   by	   Nagel	   and	   Strawson,	   in	   particular,	   we	   can	   see	   both	  gesturing	  towards	  this	  idea.46	  	  	  Fusing	  masses	  meet	   this	   constraint:	   the	  masses	   simply	   add	   up,	   they	  amass,	   to	  form	  the	  fused	  mass.	  The	  lower-­‐level	  masses	  express	  their	  nature	  in	  producing	  the	   larger	   mass;	   amassing	   is	   a	   characteristic	   thing	   masses	   do.	   Other	   intuitive	  examples	   of	   structural	   properties	   conform.	   We	   considered	   earlier	   the	  combination	  of	  atomic	  charges	   into	  a	  dipole	   in	  water	  molecules.	  When	  charges	  interact	  to	  yield	  some	  resultant,	  group	  charge,	  they	  do	  so,	  affect	  one	  another,	  as	  
charges.	  Nothing	  blocks	  or	  defies	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  component	  in	  respect	  of	  
being	  charged—each	   lower-­‐level	   charge	   is	   at	   liberty	   to	   contribute	   its	  nature	   to	  the	   atomic	   interaction,	   and	   the	   resultant	   molecular	   dipole	   is	   simply	   the	  structural	   upshot	   of	   this	   free,	   self-­‐expressive	   interaction.	   Another	   example	   is	  shape:	  one	  can	  see	  that	  in	  building	  a	  Lego	  penguin,	  say,	  the	  overall	  shape	  has	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  shapes	  of	  the	  blocks	  to	  one	  another	  to	  thank	  for	   its	  determinate	  nature:	   their	   relation	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   shape.	  When	   colors	   blend	   to	   produce	   a	  new	   color,	   as	  with	  mixing	   red	   and	   blue	   into	   purple,	   it	   is	   a	   colorful	   interaction	  with	  a	  colorful	  product.	  	  	  Contrastingly,	  paradigm	  cases	  of	  emergence	  involve	  the	  metaphysical	  defiance	  or	  
thwarting	   of	   the	   natures	   of	   the	   lower-­‐level	   properties.	   Consider	   two	   examples	  Strawson	   employs:	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   concrete	   from	   the	   abstract,	   and	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46 	  Nagel,	   recall,	   says	   ‘All	   [non-­‐emergent]	   properties	   of	   complex	   systems…derive	   from	   the	  properties	   of	   its	   constituents	   and	   their	   effects	  on	  each	  other	  when	   so	   combined’	   (1979:182,	  my	  emphasis).	   These	   interactions	   between	   constituents	   of	   the	   system	   are	   expressions	   of	   their	  metaphysical	  nature,	  i.e.	  of	  their	  characteristic	  powers.	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extension	  from	  the	  unextended.	  These	  are	  cases	  where	  the	  underlying	  properties	  cannot	   generate	   their	   product	   structurally,	   because	   inputting	  what	   they	   are—	  abstraction,	   non-­‐extendedness—makes	   no	   contribution	   towards	   what	   results.	  No	  amount	  of	  interaction	  or	  accumulation	  of	  different	   loci	  of	  abstraction	  can	  by	  
itself	   yield	   concreteness,	   and	   likewise	   for	   non-­‐extendedness.	   Given	   what	   they	  are,	  abstraction	  and	  non-­‐extendedness	   just	  don’t	  have	  what	  it	  takes	   to	  produce	  concreteness	  and	  extension.	  Quite	  the	  reverse:	  the	  product	  positively	  defies	  the	  nature	   of	   the	   antecedents.	   Thus	   concreteness	   and	   extension	   must	   emerge,	   in	  these	  cases.	  The	   ‘bruteness’	  philosophers	  associate	  with	  emergence	  is	  precisely	  this	   metaphysical	   defiance	   of	   the	   natures	   of	   the	   properties	   in	   the	   emergence	  base.	   If	   the	   antecedents’	   natures	   don’t	   constrain	   their	   product,	   anything	   is	  possible,	  so	  the	  actual	  product	  is	  bound	  to	  appear	  arbitrary.	  	  We	  can	  support	  this	  account	  by	  defusing	  a	  counterexample:	  liquidity	  is	  emergent	  by	  these	  lights,	  it	  might	  be	  said,	  since	  (following	  Strawson)	  it	  derives	  from	  non-­‐liquid	   components.	   Surely	   the	   ‘expression	   of	   their	   nature’—non-­‐liquidity—cannot	  structurally	  account	  for	  the	  production	  of	  liquidity?	  But	  it’s	  important	  to	  see	   that	   liquidity	   is	   a	   mere	   matter	   of	   the	   dynamics	   between	   a	   liquid’s	   parts:	  molecules	  are	  sufficiently	  loosely	  bonded	  that	  they	  can	  slide	  over	  one	  another,	  in	  effect.	  Thus	   liquidity	   is	   really	   a	  macro-­‐dynamic	   structuring	  of	  micro-­‐dynamical	  components:	  its	  generation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  dynamics	  all	  around.	  As	  Strawson	  says	  of	  such	  cases,	  when	  considering	  the	  micro-­‐ingredients	  and	  their	  macro-­‐product	  we	  move	   in	   ‘a	   small	   set	   of	   conceptually	   homogenous	   shape-­‐size-­‐mass-­‐charge-­‐number-­‐position-­‐motion-­‐involving	   physics	   notions’47	  Thus	   liquidity	   from	   the	  non-­‐liquid	  is	  not	  emergence,	  and	  our	  account	  explains	  why.	  	  Subjects	  being	  essentially	  discrete,	  pre-­‐existing	  subjects	  can	  make	  no	  intelligible	  contribution	   to	   the	   unified	   subjectivity	   of	   a	   subject	   they	   generate	   in	   respect	  of	  
their	  (the	  predecessors’)	  subjectivities.	  The	  end	  subject’s	  unity	  is	  precisely	  in	  the	  most	  direct	  defiance	  of	  the	  diversity	  and	  mutual	  ontological	  independence	  of	  the	  antecedents,	  which	  is	  what	  their	  being	  a	  set	  of	  subjects	  (at	  least	  partly)	  consists	  in.	   To	   create	   an	   über-­‐subject	   from	   them,	   each	   predecessor’s	   essential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  2006:13.	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subjectivity—hence,	   discreteness—is	   precisely	   the	   characteristic	   to	   be	  suppressed.	   To	   put	   the	   thought	  more	   revealingly:	   a	   set	   of	   points	   of	   view	  have	  nothing	   to	  contribute	  as	  such	   to	  a	  single,	  unified	  successor	  point	  of	  view.	  Their	  essential	   property	   defines	   them	  against	   it:	   in	   so	   far	   as	   they	   are	   points	   of	   view	  they	   are	   experientially	   distinct	   and	   isolated—they	   have	   different	   streams	   of	  consciousness.	   The	   diversity	   of	   the	   subject-­‐set,	   of	   course,	   derives	   from	   the	  essential	   oneness	   of	   any	   given	   member:	   since	   each	   subject	   is	   essentially	   a	  oneness,	   a	   set	   of	   subjects	   are	   essentially	   diverse,	   for	   they	   must	   be	   a	   set	   of	  
onenesses.	   Essential	   unity	   from	  essential	   diversity—what	  would	  be	   involved	   in	  panpsychic	   fusion—is	   thus	   a	   case	   of	   emergence,	   by	   our	   ‘defiance	   criterion’.	  ‘Consciousness	   fusion’	   is	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  emergence	   in	  a	  way	  that	  mass	  (etc.)	  fusion	  is	  not:	  Masses	  can	  bequeath	  their	  massiness	  to	  their	   fusion.	  But	  subjects	  cannot	  bequeath	  their	  subjectivity:	  it	  is	  the	  destruction	  of	  their	  property	  of	  each	  having	  a	  point	  of	  view	  that	  is	  needed.48	  	  If	   points	   of	   view	   are	   annihilated	   so	   as	   to	   produce	   a	  macro-­‐subject,	   the	  macro-­‐subjectivity	  is	  not	  a	  structural	  property.49	  Instead,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  construe	  what	  happens	   is	   to	   say	   the	  micro-­‐subjects	   brutely	   cause	   the	   successor	   to	   come	   into	  being,	  thereby	  expending	  their	  own	  claim	  to	  existence.	  This	  sort	  of	  causation	  of	  the	  new	  entity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  its	  formation	  by	  antecedent	  elements,	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  emergence	  for	  O’Connor	  and	  Wong:	  	  	   [emergents	  are]	  those	  properties	  whose	  instantiation	  does	  not	  even	  partly	  consist	  in	  the	  instantiation	  of	  distinct	  properties	  by	  the	  entity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48 	  With	   liquidity	   a	   ‘deeper’	   (dynamic)	   property	   base	   explains	   why	   the	   liquid	   can	   be	   the	  structuring	  of	  the	  non-­‐liquid.	  Similarly,	  when	  ocean	  waves	  meet	  to	  form	  a	  bigger	  wave,	  it	  is	  not	  their	  being	  waves	  that	  contributes,	  but	  their	  being	  composed	  of	  units	  that	  can	  be	  recombined	  into	  a	  single	  wave.	  The	  smaller	  waves	  are	  destroyed,	  qua	  waves,	  and	  their	  components	  made	  into	  the	  larger	  wave.	  Thus	  it	   is	  the	  properties	  of	  these	  lower-­‐level	  components	  that	  are	  operative	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  big	  wave	  (it	  is	  not	  just	  from	  waves	  of	  these	  components	  that	  you	  could	  generate	  the	   big	   wave).	   This	   ‘bypassing’	   option	   is	   not	   available	   in	   the	   case	   of	   subjectivity,	   since	   the	  panpsychist	   posits	   subjectivity	   as	   a	   fundamental	   property,	   and	   fundamental	   properties	   are	  directly	   involved	  in	  producing	  their	  higher-­‐level	   instances.	  After	  all,	   the	  reason	  the	  panpsychist	  posited	   fundamental	   subjectivity	  was	   to	   account	   for	   its	   higher-­‐level	   instantiations.	   If	   a	   deeper,	  non-­‐subjective,	   nature	   accounted	   for	   macro-­‐subjectivity,	   this	   would	   make	   the	   panpsychist’s	  micro-­‐subjects	  explanatorily—hence	  ontologically—superfluous.	  49	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   micro-­‐subjectivities:	   it	   might	   be	   structural	   with	   respect	   to	   some	   other	  lower-­‐level	  property—but	  that	  would	  leave	  the	  micro-­‐subjects	  explanatorily	  otiose,	  see	  previous	  note.	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or	   its	   parts	   [i.e.	   structural	   properties]…[emergents]	   must	   be	  explained	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   causal,	   not	   purely	   formal,	   relationship	   to	  underlying,	  immediately	  preceding	  structures.50	  	  	  	  
Panpsychist	   fusion	   clearly	   fits	   this	   rubric.	   Therefore,	   by	   insisting	   on	   micro-­‐subjects	  the	  panpsychist	  slides	  from	  constitutive	  panpsychism	  into	  emergentism.	  Recap	   of	   the	   last	   two	   sections:	   To	   avoid	   emergentism	   the	   panpsychist	   must	  render	  macro-­‐subjectivity	  as	  a	  structural	  property	  of	  an	  assembly	  of	  ultimates.	  But	   if	   ultimates	   are	   subjects	   they	   cannot	   combine	   in	   respect	   of	   subjectivity.	   If,	  alternatively,	   they	   fuse,	   their	   product	   is	   not	   structurally	   related	   to	   its	  antecedents.	   The	   resulting	   macro-­‐subject	   can	   thus	   be	   at	   best	   only	   causally	  related	  to	  its	  micro-­‐subject	  base.	  Hence	  the	  macro-­‐subject	  emerges.51	  	  	  	  Yet	   if	   panpsychists	   find	   themselves	   endorsing	   emergence	   at	   this	   juncture—to	  account	   for	   the	   production	   of	   high-­‐level	   subjects—it’s	   hard	   to	   see	   why	   they	  fought	  so	  shy	  of	  it	  earlier.	  Recall	  that	  the	  struggle	  to	  avoid	  emergence	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  panpsychism,	  which	  sought	  a	  smooth	  ontological	  transition	  from	  micro-­‐matter	   to	  macro-­‐consciousness.	   Since	  panpsychism	   is	  driven	  by	  an	  aversion	   to	  emergentism,	   the	   result	   we	   face	   is	   that	   a	   panpsychism	  which	   posits	   ultimate-­‐subjects	  is	  structurally	  unsound—it	  breaks	  its	  own	  anti-­‐emergentist	  pledge.	  	  	  To	  the	  extent	  one	  considers	  panpsychism	  committed	  to	  micro-­‐subjects,	  one	  will	  conclude	  that	  the	  view	  is	  doomed:	  it	  suffers	  from	  an	  internal	  self-­‐contradiction.52	  And	   to	   the	   panpsychist	   who	   concedes	   that	   macro-­‐subjects	   indeed	   emerge	  somehow	   out	   of	  micro-­‐subjects,	   but	  who	   has	   no	   better	   reason	   for	   postulating	  micro-­‐consciousness	   than	   to	   avoid	   its	   emergence	   in	   us,	   we	   can	   justifiably	   say	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  2001:10-­‐11.	  This	  isn’t	  to	  say	  that	  causal	  generation	  of	  properties	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  emergence,	   only	   a	   sufficient	   condition.	   See	  Wong	   2006	   for	   helpful	   classification	   of	   varieties	   of	  emergentism.	  Another	  point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  the	  causal	  production	  envisaged	  in	  this	  formulation	  of	  emergentism	   may	   well	   be	   synchronic	   causation,	   which	   perhaps	   fits	   better	   with	   traditional	  construals	  of	  emergence.	  51	  There	  was	  perhaps	  a	   cheaper	  way	  of	  getting	   to	   this	   conclusion,	  via	   the	   fact	   that	  Humphreys	  explicitly	   intends	   fusion	   to	   be	   a	   variety	   of	   emergence.	  What	   this	   cheaper	  way	  would	   not	   have	  purchased,	   however,	   was	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   what	   was	   wrong	   with	   the	   proposal	   for	  panpsychists	  in	  particular.	  52	  The	  contradiction	  is	  performative	  or	  methodological	  rather	  than	  strictly	  logical:	  in	  attempting	  to	  evade	  emergentism	  the	  panpsychist	  who	  posits	  micro-­‐subjects	  flees	  into	  the	  arms	  of	  another	  emergentism.	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that	   the	   emergence	   of	   macro-­‐phenomenality	   from	   non-­‐phenomenal	   physical	  components	   (classic	   physicalism)	   cannot	   now	   consistently	   be	   dismissed	   as	   a	  possibility.	   As	   Seager	   observes	   ‘if	   panpsychism…requires	   a	   mechanism	   of	  emergence	  then	  why	  not	  take	  the	  theoretically	  more	  economical	  route	  of	  letting	  consciousness	  emerge	  directly	   from	  the	  physical	  basis	   itself	  rather	   than	   from	  a	  mental	  basis.’53	  Indeed.54,55	  	  	  
7.	  The	  Neutral	  Monist	  Alternative	  Panpsychism’s	   internal	   tension	   is	   encapsulable	   as	   follows.	   Panpsychists	   hold,	  effectively,	  that	  all	  non-­‐fundamental	  properties	  are	  structural:	  they	  are	  reducible	  to	  more	  basic	  properties	  plus	  the	  arrangement	  of	  their	  bearers.	  This	  is	  the	  non-­‐emergence	  principle.	  It	  drives	  theorists	  to	  panpsychism	  since	  they	  consider	  that,	  short	  of	  bearing	  phenomenal	  properties,	  physical	  micro-­‐matter	  is	  an	  inadequate	  basis	  for	  consciousness.	  If	  physical	  micro-­‐matter	  lacked	  phenomenal	  properties,	  macro-­‐phenomenal	   properties	   could	   not	   be	   structural—they	   would,	  unacceptably,	   have	   to	   emerge.	   Yet	   panpsychists	   also	   insist	   that	   phenomenal	  properties—qualia—necessarily	   exist	   for	   someone,	   a	   subject	   who	   experiences	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  MS:4.	  54	  There	  are	  panpsychists	  whose	  main	  motivation	  is	  not	  aversion	  to	  emergence.	  Some	  are	  moved	  by	  Russell’s	   idea	  that	  physics	  doesn’t	  describe	  the	  intrinsic	  natures	  of	  its	  theoretical	  postulates,	  and	  that	  phenomenal	  properties	  provide	  a	  parsimonious	  way	  of	   filling	   this	  gap	  (e.g.	  Rosenberg	  2004).	   Such	   theorists	   might	   evade	   the	   thrust	   of	   my	   argument;	   however	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  ‘intrinsic	   nature	   argument’	   (see	   Seager	   2006)	   is	   highly	   controversial—far	   more	   so	   than	   the	  mundane	   thought	   that	   conventional	   physicalism	   lacks	   the	   conceptual	   resources	   to	   account	   for	  consciousness.	   Moreover	   the	   explanatory	   (anti-­‐emergentist)	   motive	   has	   been	   by	   far	   the	   main	  driver	   for	   panpsychism	   historically,	   so	   most	   panpsychists	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   present	  argument.	  	  55	  Someone	   might	   claim	   that	   since	   panpsychist	   emergence	   at	   least	   occurs	   within	   a	   class	   of	  properties,	  i.e.	  the	  emergence	  of	  	  (unified)	  subjectivity	  from	  (plural)	  subjectivity,	  such	  emergence	  is	   in	  better	  shape	  than	   ‘physicalist	  emergence’—and	  not	  the	  unacceptable	  option	  I	  deem	  it.	  But	  the	  relevant	  contrast	   is	  between	  structural	  and	  non-­‐structural	  generation	  of	  a	  property.	  Macro-­‐subjectivity	   is	   not	   a	   structural	   property	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   postulated	   micro-­‐subject	   base.	  ‘Structurality’—or	   non-­‐emergence—is	   an	   all	   or	   nothing	   affair;	   once	  we	   say	   a	   property	   is	   non-­‐structural,	   it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	   it	  happens	  to	  have	   in	  common	  with	   its	  base	  (it	  will	  also	  have	  ‘being	  spatio-­‐temporal’	  in	  common,	  if	  we	  are	  non-­‐dualists;	  in	  the	  physicalist	  case	  both	  properties	  count	  as	  cognitive,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  is	  cognitive).	  The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  new	  property	  is	  not	  derived	  from	  its	  base;	  its	  instantiation	  is	  more	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  organization	   of	   the	   basal	   items.	   Panpsychist	   and	   physicalist	   versions	   of	   emergence	   equally	  violate	  the	  structurality	  requirement,	  and	  once	  the	  panpsychist	  relinquishes	  this	  she	  has	  no	  solid	  ground	  upon	  which	  to	  dismiss	  the	  physicalist	  version,	  which,	  lest	  it	  be	  forgotten,	  is	  ontologically	  cheaper	  in	  not	  positing	  all-­‐pervading	  micro-­‐subjects.	  To	  this	  soft	  reply	  might	  be	  added	  a	  harder	  one:	  talk	  of	  ‘subjectivity’	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels	  disguises	  the	  deeper	  contrast—what	  really	  is	  required	   to	   emerge	   is	   essential	   unity	   from	   essential	   diversity,	   and	   this	   shatters	   the	   illusion	   of	  ‘intra-­‐property	  emergence’.	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them.	  Hence	  the	  ultimates	  are	  held	  to	  be	  subjects.	  But	  a	  macro-­‐subject	  cannot	  be	  a	  structural	  entity	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  lower-­‐level	  basis	  of	  micro-­‐subjects,	  as	  we’ve	  seen.	   It	   transpires,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   panpsychist’s	   commitment	   to	   micro-­‐subjects	   is	   at	   war	   with	   her	   commitment	   to	   all	   higher-­‐level	   properties—particularly	  consciousness—being	  structural.	  Something	  has	  to	  give.	  	  	  From	   our	   historical	   survey,	   we	   can	   take	   it	   that	   the	   panpsychist’s	   anti-­‐emergentism	  (her	  ‘mereological	  rationalism’,	  in	  Van	  Cleve’s	  memorable	  phrase)	  runs	   deep.	   Therefore	   what	   must	   go	   is	   the	   proliferation	   of	   subjects	   in	   micro-­‐ontology.	   I	   now	   explore	   the	   sort	   of	   doctrine	   that	   results	   from	   this	   concession.	  What	  I	  sketch	  below	  is	  something	  of	  a	  roadmap,	  indicating	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  travel	  for	  those	  motivated	  by	  panpsychism’s	  anti-­‐emergentist	  impulse.	  Working	  out	  the	  details	  of	  the	  theory	  is	  something	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  Panpsychists	   are	   plausibly	   correct	   in	   holding	   that	   qualia—the	   qualitative	  properties	  we	  find	  in	  experience—are	  irreducible,	  and	  so	  (given	  the	  structurality	  of	   higher-­‐level	   properties)	   fundamental.	   Where	   they	   err	   is	   in	   attaching	  subjectivity	   essentially	   to	  qualia:	   the	  notion	   that	   there	  must	   exist	   ‘someone’	   to	  experience	   any	   given	   quale.	   Making	   the	   ultimates	   little	   subjects	   blocks	   them	  from	  being	   able	   to	   constitute	   a	  macro-­‐subject.	   The	  moral	   of	   this	   failure	   is	   that	  qualia	  must	  be	  divorced	  from	  subjectivity—the	  awareness	  of	  qualia	  by	  subjects.	  Macro-­‐qualia	  considered	  merely	  qualitatively,	  like	  red	  patches	  in	  the	  visual	  field,	  can	   be	   rendered	   as	   structural	   properties	   with	   respect	   to	   qualitative	   micro-­‐underpinnings.	  But	  since	  subjects	  cannot	  combine	  into	  larger	  subjects,	   the	  only	  way	   to	   preserve	   the	   panpsychist	   anti-­‐emergence	   principle	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  high-­‐level	   subjecthood	   is	   to	   allow	   that,	   while	   quality	   is	   a	   fundamental	   affair,	  subjectivity	  must	  be	  susceptible	  of	  a	  reductive	  treatment.	  	  	  A	  position	  taking	  qualities	  as	   fundamental	   features	  of	  matter,	  but	  which	  makes	  subjective	   awareness	   of	   qualities	   a	   relational	   (thus	   reducible)	   affair,	   is	  neutral	  
monism,	   of	   the	   sort	   James	   later	   inclines	   towards. 56 	  On	   neutral	   monism,	  unexperienced	   qualities	   permeate	   basic	   matter.	   Certain	   portions	   of	   matter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  James	  1912/2003.	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exhibit	  a	  configuration	  which	  provides	  for	  awareness	  of	  the	  qualities	  they	  bear:	  matter,	  when	  specially	  arranged,	  can	  apprehend	  its	  own	  quality,	  in	  effect.	  This	  is	  consciousness.	   I	   now	   take	   these	   ideas	   in	   turn,	   explicating	   first	   a	   conception	   of	  qualia	   whereby	   they	   can	   exist	   unexperienced,	   then	   a	   relational	   conception	   of	  consciousness.	  Overall,	   the	  proposed	  movement	  of	   thought	   takes	  us	   some	  way	  back	   from	   panpsychism	   towards	   physicalism,	   so	   it	   won’t	   be	   surprising	   if	  physicalists	  find	  the	  end	  position	  significantly	  less	  off-­‐putting	  than	  panpsychism.	  The	  difficulty	  is	  persuading	  panpsychists	  that	  neutral	  monism	  is	  the	  way	  to	  get	  what	  they	  want	  most,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  of	  what	  they	  want.	  	  	  	  When	  discussing	   Jamesian	   ‘feelings’,	  we	  encountered	   the	  conceptual	  possibility	  of	   qualitative	   elements	   of	   experience	   existing	   apart	   from	   subjects.	   This	   is	   a	  conceptual	  possibility	   to	  which	  we	  must	  now	  extend	  metaphysical	  seriousness.	  Of	   course,	   the	   notion	   of	   unexperienced	   qualia	   is	   by	   no	   means	   anathema	   to	  mainstream	  physicalism.	  When	  a	  normal-­‐sighted	  person	  sees	  a	  blue	  sky,	  there	  is	  a	  blueness	  present	  in	  her	  visual	  experience:	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  and	  regardless	  for	  now	  of	  its	  location,	  there	  seems	  to	  exist	  a	  blue	  expanse	  of	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  aware.	  This	  blueness	   is	   a	  quale	   instantiation.	  Now,	  direct	   realists	  who	  are	  also	  color	   realists	   explicitly	   externalise	   our	   qualia,	   holding	   that	   the	   blueness	  apprehended	   in	   seeing	   the	   sky	   belongs	   to	   the	   sky	   and	   not	   to	   the	  mind	   of	   the	  seer.57	  These	  theorists	  don’t	  consider	  the	  blueness	  in	  question	  to	  evaporate	  once	  nobody	   is	   looking	   at	   the	   sky,	   for	   they	   are	   decidedly	   not	   Berkeleians.	   This	  commits	   them	   to	   the	   thesis	   that	   qualia	   can	   endure	  unexperienced.	  That	   is	   just	  the	   proposal	  we	   need	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   here,	   although	   panpsychists	   are	  more	  likely	   to	   consider	   the	   qualia	  we	   are	   aware	   of	   as	   inhering	   in	   the	  matter	   of	   the	  brain.	   Panpsychists	   tend	   to	   be	   indirect	   realists	   about	   perception,	   holding	   that	  one	   is	   perceptually	   aware	   of	   external	   items	   by	   first	   being	   aware	   of	   internally	  instantiated	  qualia.58	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  See	  e.g.	  Tye	  2009.	  	  58	  A	  neutral	  monist,	   like	  a	  panpsychist,	  doesn’t	  have	   to	  be	  an	   indirect	   realist	  about	  perception;	  nevertheless,	  these	  views	  seem	  naturally	  to	  go	  with	  indirect	  realism,	  given	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  reality	  and	  irreducibility	  of	  qualia.	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Neutral	   monism	   holds	   that	   all	   matter	   possesses	   qualia,	   which	   need	   not	   be	  experienced	  in	  order	  to	  exist.	  Just	  as	  the	  sky’s	  blueness	  or	  a	  fire-­‐engine’s	  redness	  persist	  when	  no-­‐one	   is	  around	  to	  see	  them,	  on	  a	  commonsense	  or	  naïve	  realist	  perspective,	  so	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  ultimates	  persist	  whether	  or	  not	  any	  subject	  is	  aware	  of	   them.	  A	  particular	  ultimate,	   then,	  might	  be	  phenomenally	  blue	   in	   the	  way	  a	  direct	  realist	  (color	  realist)	  believes	  the	  sky	  is	  blue.59	  On	  neutral	  monism	  when	   one	   is	   aware	   of	   a	   phenomenal	   blueness,	   one	   is	   directly	   aware	   of	   the	  qualities	  carried	  by	  ultimates	  in	  one’s	  brain.	  	  	  Strawson	  represents	  the	  panpsychist	  mainstream	  in	  holding	  that	   ‘There	  cannot	  be	  an	  experience	  without	  a	   subject	   [to	  experience	   it].’60	  But	   the	  neutral	  monist	  thesis	  that	  the	  qualities	  exhibited	  in	  experience	  can	  exist	  outside	  of	  experience	  is	  not	   the	   oxymoronic	   claim	   that	   any	   experience	   can	   exist	   unexperienced.	   It	   is	  rather	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  ingredients	  of	  an	  experience	  need	  not	  be	  experienced.	  Rejection	  of	  this	  thesis	  would	  convert	  direct	  realists	  into	  idealists,	  so	  it	  cannot	  be	  completely	  objectionable.	  If	  Strawson’s	  claim,	  alternatively,	  is	  that	  such	  qualities	  are	  ipso	  facto	  experiential,	  then	  that’s	  simply	  the	  claim	  neutral	  monists	  deny,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   claim	   blocking	   panpsychist	   explanatory	   ambitions,	   since	   it	   entails	  micro-­‐subjects.	   To	   my	   knowledge	   no	   panpsychist	   has	   provided	   a	   serious	  argument	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   qualia	   cannot	   exist	   unexperienced.	   That	   claim	  remains,	   therefore,	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   dogma	   or	   mere	   intuition.	   Opposing	   this	  intuition	   is	   common	   sense,	   where	   colors	   exist	   without	   perceivers,	   and	   pains	  sometimes	   wake	   us	   in	   the	   night.	   If	   pain	   qualia	   can	   cause	   one	   to	   come	   to	  consciousness	  of	  them,	  then	  clearly	  the	  qualia	  existed	  before	  one	  was	  conscious	  of	  them.	  So	  much	  for	  my	  attempt	  gently	  to	  accommodate	  panpsychists	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  subjectless	  qualia.	  The	  plain	   fact	   is	   that	  retaining	  the	  thesis	   that	  higher-­‐level	  properties	  are	  structural	  makes	  subjectless	  qualia	  compulsory,	  as	  long	  as	  qualia	  are	  also	  held	  to	  be	  irreducible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Cf.	   the	   particulate	   imaginings	   of	   Unger	   2005.	   There	   are	   theorists	   for	   whom	   the	   subatomic	  entities	   postulated	   by	   physics	   stand	   in	   need	   of	   a	   categorical	   nature,	   to	   underpin	   the	   relations	  physics	  catalogues	  with	  its	  equations	  (see	  Russell	  1927a	  for	  an	  influential	  account	  of	  this	  idea).	  On	  neutral	  monism,	  this	  nature	  is	  constituted	  by	  (subjectless)	  qualia.	  	  60	  2008:152.	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The	  neutral	  monist	  considers	  that	  qualities	  don’t	  require	  subjects	  to	  experience	  them—the	  whole	  material	  world	  is	  en-­‐qualitied.	  What	  of	  those	  rare	  spots	  where	  subjects	  do	  exist	  who	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  qualia	  carried	  by	  matter,	  subjects	  like	  us?	  Panpsychists	  require	  macro-­‐subjectivity	  to	  be	  a	  structural	  property,	  and	  neutral	  monism	   duly	   obliges,	   by	   rendering	   conscious	   awareness	   as	   a	   relation.	   James	  argues	  that:	  	   Consciousness	   connotes	   a	   kind	   of	   external	   relation…not…a	  special	  stuff	  or	  way	  of	  being…The	  peculiarity	  of	  our	  experiences,	  that	   they	   not	   only	   are,	   but	   are	   known,	  which	   their	   “conscious”	  quality	   is	   invoked	   to	   explain,	   is	   better	   explained	   by	   their	  relations.61	  	  For	  neutral	  monists,	  rather	  than	  a	  magical	  bubble	  or	  intrinsic	  phenomenal	  glow,	  consciousness	   is	   simply	   that	   relation	   whereby	   qualities	   are	   brought	   into	  subjectival	  awareness:	  it	  is	  the	  curling	  of	  the	  material	  world	  back	  upon	  itself,	  to	  apprehend	   its	   own	   character.	  What	   is	   the	   relation	   in	  question?	  This	   is	   an	   area	  ripe	   for	   innovation,	   for	   those	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   present	   argument.	   James	   is	  vague	   about	   the	   relation	  he	   envisages:	   he	   explains	   that	   qualia	   instances	   (‘pure	  experiences’)	  can	  exist	  both	  in	  subject	  and	  object	  ‘position’,	  as	  it	  were.	  They	  can	  be	   either	   the	   objects	   of	   ‘knowledge’,	   by	   other	   qualia,	   or	   the	   knowers.	   Such	  knowledge	   is	   the	   consciousness-­‐constituting	   relationship.	   James	   also	   talks	  suggestively	  of	  representation	  playing	  a	  role:	  	   As	   “subjective”	   we	   say	   that	   the	   experience	   represents;	   as	  “objective”	   it	   is	   represented.	   What	   represents	   and	   what	   is	  represented	   is	   here	   numerically	   the	   same…Its	   subjectivity	   and	  objectivity	   are	   functional	   attributes	   solely,	   realized	   only	   when	  the	   experience	   is	   “taken”,	   i.e.,	   talked-­‐of,	   twice…by	   a	   new	  retrospective	  experience	  (1912/2003:12)	  	  This	  is	  difficult.	  If	  we	  decamp	  to	  neutral	  monism,	  we’ll	  need	  to	  develop	  detailed	  models	  of	  the	  relevant	  representational	  mechanism.	  For	  now	  I	  restrict	  myself	  to	  one	  tentative	  concrete	  suggestion	  along	  these	  lines.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  1912/2003:13.	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Many	   find	   the	   higher-­‐order	   thought	   theory	   of	   consciousness	   (HOTT)	  unsatisfactory.62	  On	  HOTT,	   it	   is	  when	  a	   sensory	   state	   in	   the	  brain	   (e.g.	   a	   visual	  percept	   as	  of	   the	  blue	   sky)	   is	   appropriately	   represented	  by	  a	   thought	   that	   this	  state	   is	  brought	   to	   conscious	  awareness.	  There	   isn’t	   space	   to	  delve	  deeply	   into	  HOTT’s	   perceived	   shortcomings,	   but	   one	   of	   these	   is	   certainly	   its	   apparent	  struggle	   to	   capture	   the	   phenomenology.	   An	   internal	   representation	   that	   some	  sensory	   state	   obtains	   seems	   rather	   a	   dry	   thing,	   inadequate	   to	   provide	   for	  immediate,	  technicolor	  phenomenology.	  Yet	  neutral	  monists	  are	  placed	  to	  make	  one	   or	   two	   helpful	   modifications	   to	   HOTT,	   which	   may	   well	   end	   up	   making	   it	  more	  appealing	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  consciousness.	  First,	  we	  now	  take	  the	  qualia	  of	  sensory	   states	   to	   be	   ultimately	   irreducible	   features,	   the	   product	   of	   the	  structuring	   of	   qualitative	   ultimates	   composing	   these	   states	   in	   the	   brain.	   Thus	  qualia,	  which	  HOTT	  struggles	  to	  generate,	  are	  already	  built	  into	  our	  theory.	  The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  difficulty	  is	  the	  seeming	  distance	  between	  higher-­‐order	  thought	  (HOT)	   and	   represented	   sensory	   state:	   why	   would	   an	   assertoric	   thought,	   even	  about	   an	   irreducibly	   en-­‐qualitied	   substrate,	   provide	   for	   the	   immediacy	   of	  qualitative	   conscious	   experience?	   The	   HOT	   might	   do	   better	   were	   it	   more	  intimately	  associated	  with	  the	  sensory	  state	  it	  represents:	  specifically,	  we	  might	  venture	   to	   embed	   qualia-­‐carrying	   sensory	   states	  within	   the	   thoughts	   asserting	  them	   to	   be	   present.	   This	   would	   be	   something	   akin	   to	   Papineau’s	   quotational	  model	   for	   phenomenal	   concepts,63	  but	   deployed	   now	   to	   capture	   subjectival	  awareness	  of	  qualities.	  A	  HOT	  would	  then	  have	  the	  structure	  ‘This	  state	  obtains	  “	  	  	  	  	  	  “’	   with	   a	   slot	   into	   which	   the	   (irreducibly)	   sensory	   state	   literally	   enters.	   That	  would	  be	  one	  way	  of	  getting	  qualia	   right	   into	   the	  mechanism	  that	  provides	   for	  awareness	  of	  them,	  and	  rendering	  such	  awareness	  suitably	  ‘immediate’.	  	  	  I’ve	   sketched	   one	   relationist/neutral	  monist	   attempt	   to	   capture	   that	   aspect	   of	  subjectivity	   which	   is	   the	   sheer	   awareness	   of	   qualities—a.k.a.	   consciousness.64	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  For	  HOTT	  see	  e.g.	  Rosenthal	  1991.	  63	  Papineau	  2002.	  64	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  unrepentant	  panpsychists	  will	  require	  their	  own	  mechanism	  to	  explain	  macro-­‐subjectival	  awareness,	  since	  they	  don’t	  hold	  that	  every	  ultimate	  makes	   it	   into	  a	  subject’s	  experience.	  Panpsychists	  don’t	   typically	   think	  we	  experience	   the	  ultimates	   in	  our	   toenails	  or	   in	  
Saturn’s	   rings,	   so	   some	   relation	   amongst	   the	   privileged	   ultimates	   (in	   the	   brain?)	   will	   have	   to	  account	  for	  our	  awareness	  only	  of	  that	  limited	  set.	  Neutral	  monism	  is	  simply	  more	  parsimonious	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What	  about	  the	  other	  aspect	  of	  subjectivity	  I	  have	  emphasized,	  the	  separateness	  of	  subjects,	  with	  their	  concomitant	  points	  of	  view?	  How	  does	  this	  fit	  into	  the	  sort	  of	   neutral	   monism	   under	   development?	   Here	   is	   a	   suggestion.	   If	   the	   conscious	  awareness	  relation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  representation	  (in	  some	  form)	  of	  qualia	  carried	  by	   certain	   portions	   of	   the	   brain,	   the	   brain	   is	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   device	   evolved	  with	  two	  key	  tasks	  regarding	  consciousness:	  It	  firstly	  marshals	  micro-­‐qualia	  into	  macroscopic	   instances	   useful	   to	   the	   organism,	   such	   as	   macroscopic	   pains	   and	  visual	  percepts,	  and	   it	  enables	  awareness	  of	   these	  qualia	   for	   the	  organism.	  The	  set	  of	  qualia	  of	  which	  a	  given	  brain	  can	  be	  aware	  is	   limited	  to	  those	  qualitative	  instances	   within	   reach	   of	   its	   representational	   system—on	   the	   ‘neutral	   monist	  HOTT’,	  to	  those	  qualitative	  material	  conglomerations	  of	  cranial	  ultimates	  which	  can	  be	  embedded	  in	  the	  relevant	  higher-­‐order	  thoughts.	  Each	  of	  our	  brains,	  then,	  houses	   a	   point	   of	   view,	   a	   representational	   system,	  which	   can	   take	   up	   only	   the	  qualia	  instantiated	  in	  that	  brain.	  The	  qualia	  of	  another	  person’s	  brain	  are	  simply	  out	   of	   direct	   representational	   reach.	   Brains	   are	   effectively	   a	   breed	   of	   self-­‐directed	  microscopes,	  revealing	  their	  own	  inner	  qualitative	  character.65	  	  The	  neutral	  monist	  HOTT	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  relational	  theory	  of	  subjectivity	  the	  neutral	   monist	   might	   produce.	   Many	   other	   possibilities	   exist,	   awaiting	  development.	  The	   success	  of	   the	  neutral	  monist—and,	   formerly,	  panpsychist—anti-­‐emergentist	  project	  frankly	  hangs	  on	  development	  of	  an	  adequate	  relational	  model	  of	  subjectivity.	  To	  the	  extent	  one	  considers	  such	  a	  model	  impossible,	  one	  must	   be	   dubious	   about	   the	   prospects	   for	   a	   structural	   explanation	   of	  consciousness,	  comprising	  qualitative	  and	  subjective	  elements.	  The	  alternatives	  we	  would	  then	  be	  driven	  towards	  would	  be	  emergentism	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  dualism	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  
8.	  Conclusion	  I	   have	   argued,	   overall,	   that	   to	   remain	   true	   to	   their	   anti-­‐emergentism,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	  having	  that	  awareness-­‐constituting	  relation	  do	  duty	  for	  ‘consciousness’	  as	  well.	  Another	  model	  of	   awareness	   that	   suggests	   itself	   is	   the	   self-­‐representational	   theory,	   see	   e.g.	   Kriegel	   2009	   –	  though	  I	  doubt	  he	  would	  have	  much	  time	  for	  irreducible	  qualia	  (for	  an	  argument	  that	  irreducible	  qualia	  are	  compatible	  with	  physicalism	  see	  Coleman	  forthcoming).	  	  65	  Thanks	   to	   Giovanni	  Merlo	   for	   the	  microscope	  metaphor.	   The	   self-­‐representational	  model	   of	  neutral	  monism	  perhaps	  even	  more	  neatly	  explains	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  subjectivity.	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panpsychists	   must	   relinquish	   micro-­‐subjects	   of	   experience,	   even	   as	   they	   take	  qualia	  to	  be	  irreducible,	  and	  should	  aim	  to	  construct	  a	  relational	  account	  of	  high-­‐level	   subjectivity.	   This	   combination	   amounts	   to	   a	   form	   of	   neutral	   monism,	   so	  panpsychists	  should	  be	  neutral	  monists.66	  We	  can	  be	  to	  some	  degree	  optimistic	  about	  the	  chances	  of	  this	  shift,	  since	  even	  panpsychist	  Nagel	  seems	  open	  to	  the	  leading	  idea:	  ‘Presumably’	  he	  says	  ‘the	  components	  out	  of	  which	  a	  point	  of	  view	  is	  constructed	  would	  not	  themselves	  have	  to	  have	  points	  of	  view.’67	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